The 'operational code' belief system of Hua Guofeng : chairman of the communist party and premier of the state council, Peoples Republic of China by Labrecque, Terence P.
THE 'OPERATIONAL CODE' BELIEF SYSTEM OF
HUA GUOFENG: CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL,






THE 'OPERATIONAL CODE' BELIEF SYSTEM OF
HUA GUOFENG; CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL r
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
by
Terence P. Labrecque
September 19 7 9
Thesis Advisor; B_^. Hu££




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACE (Whan Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
REPORT NUMBER 2. OOVT ACCESSION NO.
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
J. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBE.R
4. TITL E . end Subitum)
The 'Operational Code' Belief System of
Hua Guofeng; Chairman of the Communist
Party and Premier of the State Council,
Peoples Republic of China
»• TYRE OF REPORT * PERlOO COVERED
Master's Thesis
September 1979
• PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AuTMORfa;
Terence P. Labrecque
• CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
f. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS. NUMBER OF PAGES
152
U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME a AOORESS/lf different from Controlling Oitlc*) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (of thia report)
UNCLASSIFIED
1Sa. OCCLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
l«. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (oi thia Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
'7. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT o< the eeyattmct antarnd In Block 30, II different from Report)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
1*. KEY WORDS (Continue on rarerta aide It neceeemy end Identity by block number)
Peoples Republic of China
Hua Guofeng
Operational Code
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae »ide It naeeaaery end Identity by block number)
The objective of this thesis is to identify and define the op-
erational code of Hua Guofeng. Insight into his estimates of
situations and a greater understanding of the norms, standards and
guidelines which influence his choice of strategy and tactics is
gained. The code is constructed from 94 open source, English
translations of Hua ' s speeches and writings.






EDITION OF I NOV «S IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- S«01 |
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dmte Bntered)

UNCLASSIFIED
<>euwx ei.*HI»'C*TiOi« Q0 Twi **9irw*t> n«i« *»••»*
20. (continued)
and protracted. Superpower hegemony is the primary source of
this conflict. Third World unity is required to create world
peace. 2. Hua views conflict as zero-sum in nature yet,
believes it is necessary for the realization of goals. 3. Hua
is highly optimistic and is certain that time is China's ally.
4. Hua believes in the predictability and irresistibility of
historical development. The role of a leader is to actively
guide history in a direction favorable to his people. 5. A
highly structured framework is a prerequisite for establishing
and achieving goals. 6. Hua advocates thorough preparation
prior to any undertaking. 7. Goals are pursued incrementally
according to plan. Hua possesses a keen understanding of the
nature of power and refrains from acting without adequate
strength. 9. Hua's operational code has been consistent over
time.
DD
1 jSn^D U73 UNCLASSIFIED
S/N 0102-014-6601 2 ,tCu-,Tv claudication o' tmi* *»aer»»«« o«»« *««•»•*)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
The 'Operational Code' Belief System of Hua Guofeng;
Chairman of the Communist Party and Premier of the
State Council, Peoples Republic of China
by
Terence P. Labrecque
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., University of Colorado, 1972
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






The objective of this thesis is to identify and define the
operational code of Hua Guofeng. Insight into his estimates
of situations and a greater understanding of the norms, stan-
dards and guidelines which influence his choice of strategy
and tactics is gained. The code is constructed from 94 open
source, English translations of Hua ' s speeches and writings.
Findings: 1. Hua views the international system as con-
flictual and protracted. Superpower hegemony is the primary
source of this conflict. Third World unity is required to
create world peace. 2. Hua views conflict as zero-sum in
nature yet, believes it is necessary for the realization of
goals. 3. Hua is highly optimistic and is certain that time
is China's ally. 4. Hua believes in the predictability and
irresistibility of historical development. The role of a
leader is to actively guide history in a direction favorable
to his people. 5. A highly structured framework is a pre-
requisite for establishing and achieving goals. Hua advocates
thorough preparation prior to any undertaking. 7. Goals are
pursued incrementally according to plan. 8. Hua possesses a
keen understanding of the nature of power and refrains from
acting without adequate strength. 9. Hua's operational code
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Few would contest the importance of the Peoples Republic of
China in the United States' global strategy or in the inter-
national system in general. In recent years her leaders have
become more pragmatic and appear to be more interested in mean-
ingful participation in and interaction with the international
system. Once a strong antagonist of the United States, she now
actively pursues a policy of cooperation and exchange with the
industrial capabilities of the West. Such changes in policy
are of course a function of many variables but one of the most
obvious is the change in leadership following Mao Zedong's
death.
Hua Guofeng's emergence as a national leader in 1976 took
many observers of the Chinese scene by surprise and immediately
launched considerable speculation regarding his political
strength and future. Chairman Hua is recognized as a balance
artist; one able to skillfully judge the relative merits and
popularity of issues and most importantly, able to judge the
winning side in advance. He appeared to be a compromise figure
when he skyrocketed to the post of Premier on 7 April 1976 and
again with his appointment to Chairman of the Communist Party
of China on 9 October 1976. As a compromise leader he was
adjudged by many analysts to be only a temporary figure yet,
he has maintained control of both leadership positions. At 57,
he is relatively young, while his major rival, Den Xiaoping

is 7 6 and likely to retire within the next five years or so.
Many analysts argue that, although not strong enough to dominate
Chinese foreign policy, his position at the top, his youth and
his political talents indicate his almost inevitable emergence
as uncontested ruler of the Peoples Republic of China for many
years to come.
For this reason, Chairman Hua clearly bears examination and
study. Relatively little is known about his background and
experience. Further, very little is known about his ingrown
beliefs, his perceptions of politics and history nor his ap-
proach to problem solving which has evolved from his political
experience. Admittedly, data for such an undertaking is limit-
ed by the nature of Communist society. However, what is avail-
able, (public statements) , is ideally suited for the develop-
ment of an operational code. Such a code provides insight into
Chairman Hua's perceptions, his philosophical and instrumental
beliefs and provides an excellent method for the content anal-
ysis of his public statements.
The primary objective of this thesis is to identify and
define the operational code of Chairman Hua Guofeng. In so
doing, insight into his estimates of particular situations and
a greater understanding of the norms, standards and guidelines
which influence his choice of strategy and tactics are gained.
Another objective is to ascertain the effect, if any, of the




In establishing Hua as a desirable candidate for an opera-
tional code study, it is imperative to address three major
issues: 1) the present uncertainty concerning the high level
decision making processes in the Peoples Republic of China,
2) the Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping relationship and 3) the prog-
nosis for Hua's survivability.
1. The ability of western analysts to accurately predict
or anticipate Politburo actions is dismal at best. David Bona-
via, for example, concedes that analysts are "floundering in
their attempts to interpret (let alone forecast) the murky
Peking scene." (103:11)
One has but to monitor the ebb and flow of the Hua
Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping controversy for a graphic day by day
demonstration of uncertainty and confusion on the part of
Western analysts. No one really understands that relationship
nor the line up of factions within the Politburo. Jurgen
Domes hit the nail on the head when he stated, "The machinery
of crisis solution and decision making within the Chinese
leadership remains shrouded in mystery." (107:473)
2. A rivalry and contention between Hua Guofeng and Deng
Xiaoping has been espoused at varying levels of intensity since
the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in October 1975
At this conference three different concepts of rural social
policy were proposed by: 1) Deng leaning to the right, 2)
Jiang Qing leaning to the left and 3) Hua in the middle. (107:
482) This juncture signaled the beginning of Deng's second

political demise and Hua's ascent as a compromise figure.
The rivalry is generally attributed to divergent views
associated with the utility of ideology and possibly a fester-
ing of revenge on the part of Deng Xiaoping. It spans a broad
spectrum, including the approaches to agriculture, moderniza-
tion of the military, economic incentives and the role of
ideological and political work in the social and economic
spheres.
Rumors of an imminent showdown between Hua and Deng have
been circulating since mid 1977 following Deng's rehabilita-
tion. Most controversies and leadership changes have been
viewed from this perspective yet, this "showdown" has never
publicly materialized.
It is ludicrous to assume that no differences exist
between the two leaders and, in fact, evidence does exist which
lends support to the view of a Hua-Deng rift. After all, Hua
was the primary benefactor of Deng's 1976 disgrace and occupies
a position (Premier) once coveted by Deng. Additionally, he
actively participated in the "criticize Deng Xiaoping 's counter
revolutionary revisionist line" campaign engineered by the
Gang of Four. In essence, there is a basis for Deng to harbor
some level of animosity toward Hua.
The more current indications of simmering tensions in-
clude the demotion of several former Hua allies (WuTeh, Wang
Dongxing) along with an overall trend toward de-Maoization.
De-Maoization does not resemble Soviet de-Stalinization of
1954 but rather, is a recent trend which interprets and
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utilizes Mao's major contributions in the context of his era
and its particular problems, but also recognizes Mao as a senile
old man, easily manipulated prior to his death. Such a cam-
paign can only benefit Deng. The public questioning of Mao's
mental capacity near the end leaves the Tien An Men demonstra-
tions, Deng's subsequent dismissal and Hua's appointment as
Premier open to reexamination and interpretation. Additionally,
signs of disagreement are emerging over the utility of China's
communal system. This disagreement somewhat parallels the two
positions advanced by Hua and Deng in 197 5 at the National
Conference on Learning from Tachai . The basic issue is collect-
ivism (Hua) versus motivation through individual gain (Deng)
and it effects industry as well as agriculture. Certainly the
issue is far from resolved:
"The particularly hard line on agriculture being
taken by Hunan province — where Hua spent much
of his working life — may possibly indicate that
he is behind a move to prevent the break-up of
production teams (into family oriented enter-
prises)." (104:15)
Additionally, Radio Changsha has condemned the "tendency to
view farm production as being more important than ideological
and political work — an attitude known to be strongly espoused
by Deng." (104:15)
Opposing these plausible arguments in support of a
Deng-Hua rift are an equally convincing set of arguments which
stress the improbability of a showdown.
First, there are three factors which offset the
feasibility of Deng vengeance. It was the leftist Gang
11

of Four led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, not Hua, who organized
Deng's downfall. Yet, it was Hua who, in a rather adroit piece
of political maneuvering, brought about the purging of the
entire Gang of Four. Additionally, Hua supported Deng's re-
instatement. Some analysts theorize that Hua and Deng worked
together to oust the radical Wang Dongxing (115:10) and that
Hua is not a target of the democratization and de-Maoist cam-
paigns. In fact, were the campaigns to culminate in a Polit-
buro showdown, Hua and Deng would be on the same side. (103:10)
Deng has gone on record denying the existence of serious dis-
agreement between the two leaders. He publicly praised Hua's
abilities and divorced Hua from any direct connection with the
Tien An Men incident. (126:3)
The most significant argument belaying a Hua-Deng con-
frontation is quite simply an overriding need for a semblance
of stability and unity. The outbreak of yet another "two- line"
struggle would be devastating to China and to the overall goals
shared by both leaders.
3. A great deal of speculation has centered on Hua's
future since the day he was appointed Acting Premier. (105:156)
The prognosis for Hua's survival and the consolidation of power
were generally poor because his appointment caught observers
by surprise, he was relatively unknown and he was believed to
be a compromise choice. Yet, he is not only the only man in
history to hold both Chairman of the CCP and Premier of the
State Council positions simultaneously, he has done so for
three turbulent years. On at least three occasions, analysts
12

were certain that Hua would surrender at least the Premiership.
Yet today, two years after Deng's rehabilitation, one and one
half years after the Fifth National Peoples Congress and six
months after the brakes were applied to the democratization
campaign, Hua retains both positions. Hua has, in a sense,
become a symbol of Chinese unity and political stability; such
a symbol is not easily discarded. (85:24)
There are other factors, both from Hua's career and his
personality which will hold him in good stead vis-a-vis poten-
tial political opponents, Deng, in particular. Hua's foremost
personal characteristic is his ability to be self-effacing at
the right time, an ability shared by China's most survivable
leader, Zhou Enlai. This ability, which in Hua's case is also
a predilection and a standard practice throughout his career,
allows his relationship with the more outgoing and pugnacious
Deng (105:160) to be compatible. This quality also makes Hua
a more difficult target to attack.
Hua's second most characteristic trait is his flexibil-
ity and opportunism. His sudden shift from the Cultural Rev-
olutionary Left (Gang of Four) to the military right, in 1976,
demonstrates his ability to accurately read the winds of change
and pick the winning side. His ability to balance between rival
factions is in evidence throughout his career. He can cooperate
and sympathize with all factions, but formally (and irrever-
sibly) identifies with none. For this reason, Hua has been and
will continue to be essential as an unobtrusive and highly
acceptable compromise choice. It is also for this reason that
13

Hua remains above intra Politburo factional purging, i.e.,
former allies may go but Hua remains. (85:24)
Hua has one other very important nonnegotiable advan-
tage: youth. At 57, Hua is almost twenty years Deng's junior
Deng's effective political life can hardly be more than an-
other five years. Essentially, Hua has but to wait out Deng's
physical demise. Although formally ranked second, it is gen-
erally agreed that Deng currently controls more votes in the
Politburo than Hua. (85:24) Yet Hua clearly possesses power
and prestige and is serving in a unification role which is
absolutely necessary to the success of Deng's modernization
policies
.
In early 1977, David Bonavia addressed the subject of
why Hua would back the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. Now,
more than two years later, his argument remains relevant and
plausible in terms of their political partnership and Hua '
s
future.
"If he runs true to past form, Hua will continue
coming up through the middle by balancing rival
factions, and at the moment when he sees the
balance tipping decisively in one direction, will
throw his weight with it and be rewarded as a
result. The reward which Teng (Deng) and his
supporters can still offer Hua, even though he is
already Chairman and Premier, is security of
tenure" and the chance to end his days as the
truly accepted and unquestioned leader of the most
populous nation on earth. (97:17)




1. that Hua Guofeng is a powerful force in the Peoples
Republic of China
2. that the prognosis for Hua's uncontested control with-
in five years is very high
3. that Western analysts' current understanding of Chinese
political decision making processes is poor.




II. HUA GUOFENG BACKGROUND
"Comrades working in the provinces will sooner
or later come to the Centre. Comrades at the
Centre will sooner or later either die or leave
the scene. Khrushchev came from a local area.
At the local level the class struggle is more
acute,, closer to natural struggle, closer to
the masses . This gives the local comrades an
advantage over those at the Centre."
Mao Tse-tung, March, 1958 (116:114)
Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, is the epitome of the above
description. Although a rather enigmatic figure, Hua is clearly
the vanguard of the second generation of Chinese Communist
leadership. Too young for any significant role in the revolu-
tionary years, Hua ' s career path has been marked by skillful
and dependable bureaucratic service and successful transforma-
tion into a "political generalist." (130:3)
Although cited as a "rising star" by the World Press in
1973, Hua's elevation to Premier and Chairman in 1976 took
most of the world by surprise. His origins, background and
beliefs were unknown and remain essentially so to this day.
Following his election to the Chairmanship of the CCP in 1976,
the Chinese Press launched a rather sporadic campaign designed
to alleviate some of the voids associated with Hua's past and
generally create an image of closeness and similarity between
Hua and Mao Zedong. Probably because the campaign was struc-
tured for domestic consumption in an attempt to soothe dom-
estic tension and uncertainty, many of the assertions appear
erroneous and pointedly inflated. Oksenberg and Yeung assem-
bled an account of Hua's rise through the Party bureaucracy
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prior to the Cultural Revolution by analyzing available issues
of the Hsin Hunan Pao (New Hunan Daily) prior to 1960 and mon-
itored Changsha Radio broadcasts from 1963 to 1966. Their work
provides the best available glimpse of Hua's early years and
indicates that Hua's rise, although certainly remarkable, was
not as "meteoric" as first assessed.
Born in 1920, in Shansi province, Hua's early communist
years were spent in the Luliang mountain guerrilla stronghold
in Shansi where he remained until 1949. During this period, Hua
served as a county level Party secretary and as political offi-
cer of the local troops (a component of the Second Field Army
under the command of Deng Xiaoping) . Hua journeyed to Hunan
in the summer of 1949 shortly after its Communist takeover,
where he became the leading Party secretary in Hsiang-yin
county and political commissar of the County Armed Forces De-
partment. For the next two years, Hua was involved in militia
work, restoring agricultural production, and the implementation
of the land reform directives.
In July, 19 51, Hua was transferred to Hsiang-t'an as county
Party secretary. Although technically not a promotion, this
new assignment afforded Hua greater opportunities, because
Hsiang-t'an county was larger, encompassed a large municipality
for greater exposure and, most importantly, included Shao-shan,
Mao's home town. During this one year assignment, Hua concen-
trated on organizing and implementing mutual aid teams (MATs)




In October, 1952, Hua was promoted to head of the Hsiang-
t'an special district government office. With this promotion,
Hua not only rose to the ranks of the upper cadres but shifted
from party to government work. By March, 195 5, Hua was the
ranking secretary in the district which included twelve counties.
Hua spearheaded the cooperativization drive in his district with
a great amount of success. The rate of cooperativization in
Hsiang-t'an district was twice that of the rest of Hunan which
ranked 27th out of 28 provinces. (130:13) In essence, Hua be-
came the one shining light in a province very sluggishly im-
plementing Mao's cooperativization directive. Presumably be-
cause of this success, Hua soon assumed a leading role in Hunan's
cooperativization drive and published three important articles
which closely paralleled and provided major support for Mao's
31 July speech calling for an accelerated cooperativization
pace. He gained national prominence in November, 1955 when the
leading theoretical journal, Hsueh-hsi, carried a Hua article
stressing the importance of accurate class analysis in imple-
menting cooperativization. His article appeared in the same
issue which carried Mao's 31 July speech.
In 1956 Hua became the head of the Provincial Government
Culture and Education Office. Although again technically not a
promotion, his new job encompassed a greater degree of res-
ponsibility and authority and came at a pivotal point in time.
(130:16) During his one year tenure, Hua was instrumental in
organizing and implementing, in Hunan, two major national cam-
paigns: The Eliminate Illiteracy Campaign and the Spread the
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Use of Kuo-yu (national dialect) Campaign. Additionally, Hua
and his staff were tasked to "remedy deficiencies among ele-
mentary schools, to consolidate and improve the system of
Chinese medicine in the province, to organize an exhibition of
peasant art, to strengthen ideological work in middle schools,
to supervise the assignment of middle school graduates to their
new jobs or to universities, and to manage the Rectification
Campaign in the middle and primary schools." (130:17)
In 1957, Hua won an important promotion, over several
superiors, to head the CCP United Front Department in Hunan.
This appointment also occurred at a crucial time following the
Hundred Flowers Campaign and during its anti-rightist after-
math. Hua ' s department directed the Anti-Rightist and Recti-
fication Campaigns among Hunan's ethnic minorities, organized
religions, democratic parties allowed to coexist with the CCP
and industrialists and merchants who had cooperated with the
CCP. Oksenberg and Yeung summarized Hua ' s performance as
follows: "Hua was tough but not excessive, responsive to Pek-
ing yet not disturbing of the balance that had emerged in Hunan,
He gained in stature from the campaign, but not in an evidently
assertive, headline seeking way." (130:22)
With his job completed and the Anti-Rightist Campaign sub-
siding, Hua left the United Front Department in 1958. It is
not precisely clear what position Hua then assumed, however, it
is clear that he suffered no loss of stature. Positions and
assignments held sequentially and at times simultaneously in-
cluded head of the Party Committee's Economic Small Group,
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vice-chairman of the Hunan Provincial Committee on Scientific
Work, vice-chairman of the Committee for Support of the Con-
struction of Keypoint Projects, chairman of the Preparatory
Committee for the Hunan Economic Construction Exhibition Hall,
member of the Provincial Party Committee, director of the Anti-
Schistosomiasis Campaign and provincial Vice Governor. Once
again, Hua had gravitated toward the central issue of the
moment: economics and implementation of the Great Leap For-
ward. Although "not overwhelmed by the euphoria of the moment"
and mindful that moving too fast could be damaging, Hua assumed
a major leadership role in resolving the logistics problem asso-
ciated with the support of communalization. (130:24)
In August 1959, the Provincial First Secretary, Chou Hsiao-
chou, was purged as an ally of P'eng Teh-huai and Hua hurdled
several members of the Party Standing Committee to become a
Provincial Party Secretary. Oksenberg and Yeung concluded that
the most plausible explanation for this significant promotion is
that Hua "while not necessarily deliberately seeking to under-
mine First Secretary Chou, nonetheless furnished Mao with some
of the data he needed to refute the P'eng (Teh-huai) attack.
Already impressed with Hua ' s 195 5 performance (supporting Mao's
31 July speech) Mao recommended Hua as a man who could appro-
priately be promoted." (130:33) Following this promotion, Hua
became a member of the presidium for the Provincial Conference
of Advanced Collectives and Advanced Producers, a vice-chairman
of the Preparatory Committee to celebrate the 10th anniversary
of the founding of The Republic, and vice-chairman of the Pro-
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visional CPPCC organization. He delivered the government work
report at the Second Session of the Second Provincial Assembly,
a task generally reserved for the governor.
During the Anti-Rightist Opportunist Campaign which follow-
ed in the aftermath of P ' eng Teh-huai s dismissal, Hua's offi-
cial responsibilities included directing that campaign in the
finance and trade arenas. However, his informal preoccupation
became correcting the increasingly severe urban supply crisis
associated with the Great Leap Forward. This dichotomy of
responsibilities put Hua in a particularly delicate position.
On the one hand, he was responsible for purging P'eng Teh-huai
sympathizers while on the other, he was expected to alleviate
the "shortages" P'eng and his supporters alleged existed, but
which were denied by the official party line. In carrying out
the latter responsibility, Hua stressed self-reliance. Local
units would have to get out of the situation through their own
efforts; external assistance would only be secondary. Addi-
tionally, Hua headed an inspection team which fanned throughout
Hunan evaluating the results of the "Economize and Increase
Production" campaign and identifying model units who, through
their own ingenuity, were able to attain the goals assigned.
Available issues of the New Hunan Daily (Oksenberg and
Yeung's primary source used in charting Hua's early career)
terminated in December, 1960 so the detail associated with
Hua's. movements and activities becomes more sporadic and enig-
matic until the 1970 's in Peking. From 1960-1964 Hua continued
to trouble-shoot agricultural problems. This period included
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numerous fact finding inspection tours in diverse, rural areas
and a great deal of personal effort toward developing Mao-t'ien
into Hunan's model agricultural unit. On April 2, 1963, Hua
wrote an article describing Mao-t'ien' s exploits including the
monumental task of guaranteeing a water supply in rough drought-
prone terrain. Later that year, Mao toured Hunan and greatly
praised the example of Mao-t'ien. The available evidence sug-
gests that, as in 1955 and 1959, Mao drew heavily upon Hunan
(and Hua) to document his position concerning the need for ideo-
logical and organizational vigilance in the countryside.
(130:45) Available evidence indicates that Hua did return to
Changsha in late 196 3 to undertake an active role in the Social-
ist Education Campaign and the Four Clean-ups.
As the Viet Nam War began to escalate in late 1964, China
became concerned with improving the efficiency of the Peoples
Liberation Army and generally preparing for possible involvement
Hunan was ideally located as a secondary staging area so the
province became embroiled in the preparations. Hua was in-
timately involved in these activities and became the Hunan
spokesman on the Viet Nam War in both public and private
gatherings. (130:47) This exposure capped his emergence as a
political generalist by giving him a discernible role in foreign
policy and national security affairs. (130:48)
In 1965-1966, Hua continued along the same line, working in
a wide range of activities including: water conservation,
agriculture, education, military affairs, public health and
women's work. By the advent of the Cultural Revolution, Hua
22

had completed his transformation from a competent bureaucrat
to a provincial political figure. Ranking fourth in the Hunan
political hierarchy at the outset of the Cultural Revolution,
Hua ranked first at its conclusion.
Very little is known about Hua's precise activities during
the Cultural Revolution. On August 10, 1967, Hua was desig-
nated along with Li Yuan, to establish the Hunan Preparatory
Group of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee. The function
of this Committee was to "take over the Party, administrative
and financial affairs in Hunan." (151:83) He is known to have
weathered (possibly with Mao's personal assistance) a severe
attack by the Red Guards in early 1968. When the Hunan Revolu-
tionary Committee was established in April 1968, Hua became the
Second Vice-Chairman, losing ground to his major rival, Li who
became Chairman. In April 1969, Hua became deputy for Hunan
to the Ninth CCP Congress and subsequently, was elected to the
Central Committee. From this point on, authority in Hunan
began to shift to Hua. (151:85)
Following Li Yuan ' s purging in April 1970, Hua emerged as
the supreme figure in Hunan due to two successive contests with
the leading military authorities in Hunan (both of whom were
aligned with Lin Piao) . In November 1970, Hua was elected First
Secretary of the CCP Hunan Committee. From February 25 until
September 4, 1971 Hua was not seen in public. He was summoned
to Peking in November following the Lin Piao incident and given
a major military position, Political Commissar of the Canton
Military Region. The nature of Hua's precise duties in 1972 to
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1973 while in Peking are not certain. It is speculated that Hua
was involved in the investigation of the Lin Piao affair and
was Director of the United Front Department of the CCP Central
Committee. (151:86)
In August 197 3, Hua became a member of the Politburo at the
Tenth CCP Congress. At the Fourth National Peoples Congress in
January 1975 Hua was named a Vice Premier (ranking sixth) and
Minister of Public Security. Although certainly still on the
rise, Hua's leap from the number six Vice Premier to Acting
Premier in January 1976, upon Zhou Enlai ' s death took everyone
by surprise. He was subsequently appointed Premier and First
Vice Chairman of the CCP. On October 6, 1976, one month after
Mao's death, Hua helped engineer the arrest of the Gang of Four
and was subsequently named Chairman of the CCP. He continues
to maintain these top positions.
Several key features of Hua's personality and style can be
gleaned from his career. First, and probably most important
because of its direct impact upon this thesis, is his penchant
for self-effacement. Throughout his career, Hua has preferred
to be unobtrusive and has by and large avoided the limelight in
contrast to many of his peers. (130:18) Oksenberg and Yeung
observed that Hua prefers a "bureaucratic style" of communica-
tion; a style in which his remarks are limited to in house
circulation. Although the press is encouraged to incorporate
these views into editorials, Hua tends to avoid directly link-
ing these with his name.
24

Hua's personal life remains almost a complete official
blank. An article in Cheng Ming claimed that Hua is using an
alias. His real name was reported to be Su Chu. He has a wife,
Han Chih-chun who is never seen or officially referred to, as
well as four children who use the surname Su. It has been
theorized that Hua chose his "new" name by picking three charac-
ters from Chung Hua Kang Jih Chiu Kuo Hsien Feng Tui (the
Chinese Vanguard Troop to Resist Japan and Save the Country)
.
David Bonavia refers admiringly to Hua's ability to be self-
effacing at "the right time" and likens him to Zhou Enlai in
this regard. (105:160)
It is primarily because of this orphic personality that Hua
has generally preferred not to be a public orator hence, the
amount of data available for this thesis is considerably less
than that which would be available for a more outspoken figure
such as Deng Xiaoping. Additionally, his avoidance of the
limelight throughout his career has literally shrouded him in
mystery. His appointment as acting Premier in 1976 was termed
a "revelation" by some analysts, (84:24) and Hua has been
referred to as "China's Mysterious Leader" and "Peking Mystery
Man." (85:24) On the other hand, his flair for self-effacement
and in particular, his ability to avoid irreversible identifica-
tion with any faction has rendered him ideally suited as an
umpire for intra-Politburo disputes and a compromise candidate.




One of the apparent hallmarks of Hua's work style is his
propensity for personal investigation. Oksenberg and Yeung
theorize that the importance of this technique was engraved
into Hua's mind as a result of an unfortunate incident in 1951
while serving as Hsiang-yin County Secretary. It appears that
Hua routinely endorsed, without query, the death sentence of an
innocent peasant, Yang Te-lun. When the incident came to light
during the San-Fan Movement in July 1952, Hua was required to
confess to a minor bureaucratic error for the excessive quick-
ness with which the case was concluded and for blindly accept-
ing the report from below without independent verification.
Undoubtedly embarrassed by this unfortunate lesson, Hua's sub-
sequent career is marked by an almost fanatical use of inspec-
tions and personal investigations into conditions under his
purview.
The third aspect of Hua's career which stands out for its
uniqueness is the great diversification of assignments and
acquired expertise. Unlike the standard career path in China,
Hua did not remain locked in one specialty but rather, acquired
expertise in, among other areas, Agriculture, Trade, Finance,
Education and Military Affairs. This diversity came as a
direct result of Hua's demonstrated talent for problem solving.
All key assignments were made at times of crisis in the respec-
tive area. For example, Hua was assigned to the United Front
Department in 19 57 to handle the sticky Anti-Rightist Campaign.
His brief stint in the Culture and Education Department coinci-




It would seem from looking at Table 1 that no matter what
Hua's assignment, his activities and pursuits always tended to
gravitate toward the central issue of the day. In fact, Oksen-
berg and Yeung commented that "through an indiscernible combina-
tion of interest, ability and invitation, he (Hua) consistently
drifted to the center of the action." (13 0:52)
The following selection of analysts' adjective-like descrip-
tions of Hua effectively summarize his basic qualities and cap-
sulize his personality. They are included to acquaint the
reader with Hua, the individual, and serve as a back drop for
understanding his operational code.
"tough minded administrator" (130:22)
"solid and thorough" (130:18)
"very sober sense for gravitations of power" (107:489)
"smooth and devious" (102:8)
"pragmatic problem solver" (130:18)
"adept at coordinating subordinates" (130:19)
"first and foremost an opportunist" (107:488)
"competence and responsiveness without flamboyance" (130:28)
"considerably developed flexibility on principles" (107:489)
"cautious and noncontroversial" (152:40)
"mild and softspoken" (96:6)
"meticulous in organization and direction" (132:39)
"unobtrusive manner" (96:6)
"shrewd and forceful" - James R. Schlesinger (86:25)
"I would compare (his succession to Mao) to the replacement
of President Roosevelt by President Truman in 1945"
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This chapter is designed to provide the reader with an under-
standing of belief systems analysis, its potential and its prob-
lems. It explores the development of the operational code con-




An individual's behavior is, to a large degree, determined
by the way in which he perceives, diagnoses and evaluates his
environment. It is generally agreed that in order to cope with
the very complex reality of one's environment, individuals must
by necessity, form simplified, structured beliefs about the
nature of that environment.
Because the foreign policy environment, in particular, is
"characterized by structural uncertainty" (189:18) a decision
maker is driven to interpret this confusion and uncertainty by
filtering his perceptions through clusters of beliefs or "cog-
nitive maps" of different parts of his social and physical
environment. (175:3) In other words, an individual tends to
assimilate new perceptions to familiar ones and strives to
minimize subjective discrepancies between these perceptions and
previous expectations. (186:20) Consequently, his "psycho-
logical environment" may vary widely from reality and subsequent




This central role of belief systems in decision making has
long been recognized. (187:3) Yet, empirical research in this
area has been slight and somewhat dis junctured . Extensive ap-
plication of cognitive approaches has been inhibited by various
methodological problems (such as, data access and laboriousness
of coding) and three general criticisms concerning the relevancy
of the approach in general. These criticisms are: skepticism
about the relevance of the contribution of psychology to the
analysis of political phenomena, the canon of parsimony, and
problems of linking beliefs to foreign policy actions. (175:6)
The first criticism concerns the wisdom of borrowing the-
ories and concepts from a discipline which itself lacks con-
census concerning the role of belief systems.
The parsimony argument asserts that by the time one has
considered the systemic, societal, governmental and bureau-
cratic aspects of political, action most of the variance in for-
eign policy making has already been accounted for. Individual
attributes of the decision maker are therefore of a residual
nature. Consequently, extensive research on belief systems is
not justifiable from an economic standpoint. One achieves
greater insight for his labors by concentrating on other levels
of analysis.
The third criticism evolves from a basic inability on the
part of some researchers (and critics) to realize that direct
linkages between beliefs and action do not exist. Rather than
serving as direct guides to action, they are one of several
intervening variables that affect decision behavior. (175:23)
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Although there are several approaches to the study of belief
systems and decision making, i.e., mind sets, cognitive maps,
psycho-logic and operational codes, they all share several
premises. The first is a disenchantment with the apparent in-
adequacy of the black-box approach to understanding decision
output. Second, it is assumed that the belief systems them-
selves are systematically related to the way in which leaders
perceive, diagnose, prescribe and choose, especially in situa-
tions of uncertainty. The third is the belief that the attri-
butes of decision makers are not only important, but are a
logical starting point for political analysis. This final pre-
mise, in effect a rebuttal of the parsimony criticism, is sup-
ported by numerous studies.
Robert J. Art, for example, concluded that the more impor-
tant decisions in recent American foreign policy are better
explained by the "mind-sets" of top leaders than by a bureau-
cratic politics perspective. (156:467) Glen H. Stassen's re-
evaluation of Rosenau's data on the behavior of United States
Senators toward Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles reveal-
ed that "belief-sets" provided a more plausible explanation of
their behavior than did role. (188:96)
In short, there is a growing body of empirical research
supporting the notion that belief systems are central to and
perhaps dominate, decision making. Matthew Bonham and Michael
Shapiro sum up this position by stating that, "beliefs of for-
eign policy decision makers are central to the study of de-
cision outputs and probably account for more of the variance
than any other single factor." (159:161)
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Acknowledging that cognitive studies are relevant and
profitable, although still suffering from the fragmented and
relatively non-cumulative nature of existing research, 0. R.
Holsti concluded that what was required was a framework and
concepts which were "neither at such a low level of abstraction
that they will be of value only in a single case (i.e., beliefs
about the value of the Panama Canal) nor at such a high level
as to have little recognizable relationship to politics."
(175:34) The operational code construct has evolved over the
last twenty-five years specifically to meet this requirement.
B. THE LEITES CONTRIBUTION
The operational code concept had its beginnings in Nathan
Leites ' book, The Operational Code of the Politburo published
in 1951. This was followed by Leites' A Study of Bolshevism
in 1953. The first work attempted to ascertain the Politburo's
beliefs, tactics, strategies and values by means of qualitative
content analysis of Politburo action accounts and the public
statements of Lenin and Stalin. The later work went farther
in attempting to develop the precepts or maxisms of political
tactics and strategy that characterized the classical Bolshevik
approach to politics. In each case, Leites promoted the op-
erational code as "a set of general beliefs about fundamental
historical issues and central questions as these bear, in turn,
on the problem of action." (166:191)
Leites ' work received mixed reviews as a tool for relevant
political research and essentially lay in limbo until the mid
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1960's when Alexander George of Stanford University further
developed Leites 1 concepts. Most of the criticism and subse-
quent avoidance of Leites 1 approach centered around two areas.
The first concerned Leites' incorporation of psychoanalytic
theory which was deemed inappropriate for political research.
The second is summed up by John Weakland, who noted that
Leites 1 work is "remarkably simple in overall organization, and
for a work aiming to present a code, it gives little attention
to synthesis and systematization. " (18 5:D11) Stated another
way, Alexander George commented that, "he (Leites) did not
clarify sufficiently the order, hierarchy and interrelationships
among the various elements of the 'code.'" (166:196)
C. THE GEORGE CONTRIBUTION
In 1969, Alexander George published an article entitled
"The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision-Making." (166:190) In this work,
George summarizes Leites' effort and sets out to correct the
two aforementioned criticisms. He carefully "factored out"
(166:195) the operational code position of the study and struc-
tured it into a system of five philosophical and five instru-
mental belief questions which were felt to encompass the es-
sence of one's political beliefs.
The philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and premises
that the subject makes regarding the fundamental nature of
politics, the nature of political conflict and the role of the
individual in history. The instrumental beliefs encompass
35

beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of
political action. (166:199) George maintained that answers to
these "questions" could be derived via qualitative or non-
frequency content analysis. These beliefs also provide norms,
standards and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of
strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alter-
native action." (166:191) George was quick to caveat the above
statement by asserting that an operational code influences but
"does not unilaterally determine" (166:191) decision making.
In other words, it is an important, but not the only variable
shaping decision making. George does maintain, however, that
the code has an abnormally high level of importance in decision
making in certain types of situations: 1) Non-routine situa-
tions like wars, alliances, etc., 2) Decisions made by top lead-
ers affected less by organizational processes, 3) Long-range
policy planning in which uncertainty of the future brings out
differences among policy makers, 4) Ambiguous situations due to
little information and open to a variety of interpretations,
5) Circumstances of information overload where a considerable
amount of filtering is needed, 6) Unanticipated events where the
initial reaction might depend on a belief system, 7) Situations
of stress in which normal cognitive processes are impaired such
as, frustration or aggression. (162:20)
Most of the operational code studies completed to date
utilized the George construct. Subjects of these studies
include: Willy Brandt, James F. Byrnes, Frank Church, Mark
Hatfield, Ramsay MacDonald, Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles,
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Kurt Schumacher, Pierre Trudeau, John Kennedy and others. Al-
though following the same general framework, these analyses are
uneven in quality. (175:41)
Holsti cites three problems with the George construct and
the studies developed from it: (175:41)
1) The construct allows too much leeway in the interpre-
tation of each of the ten questions. (i.e., some cases
explore different dimensions of a given belief and are
therefore difficult to compare)
.
2) There is no uniformity in the nature of evidence used
as indicators for the beliefs.
3) The method is not conducive toward quantitative analysis
In other words, category definitions and the rules of
inclusion are poorly specified.
D. THE HOLSTI CONTRIBUTION
Under grant to the National Science Foundation, 0. R. Holsti
expanded upon the George construct. (172+17 5) The original set
of questions that constituted the George version were broken
down into a more detailed and precise set of subsidiary ques-
tions and extensive rules for coding answers to them. For
example, instead of merely asking the question "What is the
nature of the political universe?" in which case the analyst is
relatively free to explore and/or emphasize any one of many
possible aspects, the analyst also asks "What is the nature of
conflict?, What are the conditions of peace?, What is the scope
of conflict?, What is the role of historical development? and
What is the source of knowledge for this belief?. Within each
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subcategory there are typologies of responses which allow the
coder to determine approximately what type of answer he is look-
ing for. For example, in asking, "What is the nature of con-
flict?, the coder is trying to determine if the actor considers
the world to be: 1) conflictual, 2) harmonious, 3) mixed, 4)
other. This format permits an analyst who is unfamiliar with
content analysis procedures, to accomplish an operational code
in depth by giving specific instructions and typologies of
responses that give a frame of reference for possible answers.
This format also facilitates quantitative analysis, provides
uniformity and thereby helps control the potential skewness
of data and allows for comparative analysis.
E . DATA
Every published statement (English Language) made by Hua
Guofeng appearing in the following sources since 1967 was
accumulated and coded for this thesis: Current Background
,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (PRC) , Peking Review ,
Selections from China Mainland Magazines and Survey of China
Mainland Press . Every effort was made to locate and utilize
all known Hua speeches and writings . Appendix A depicts the
material by year in two ways. The first table shows the fre-
quency of speeches/writings for each year while the second
table tabulates the volume (in terms of single spaced pages)
by year. As would be expected, both measures increase directly
as a function of time.
Although the question of whether public statements truly
reflect private beliefs cannot be definitely resolved, only
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open sources were used in this analysis for two reasons. First,
and most obvious, is the fact that these are the only sources
available. Second, ongoing monitoring of public sources can
easily be accomplished allowing for periodic updates of the
code.
F. CODING
Coding was accomplished using the structure outlined in
0. R. Holsti's The "Operational Code" As an Approach to the
Analysis of Belief Systems . The Holsti structure, itself, has
already been briefly described in an example of one belief
category, its subsidiary questions and sample response typol-
ogies. The following is a list of the basic categories and
subsidiary questions comprising the operational code method-
ology. Each subsidiary question has a set of response typol-
ogies which facilitate and standardize the coding. Each
category, subcategory and response typology is explained in
greater detail in the following chapter.
Philosophical Beliefs
la. What is the "essential" nature of the political
universe?
Is the political universe basically conflictural
or harmonious?
What are the sources of conflict?
What are the conditions of peace?
What is the nature of conflict?
What is the scope of conflict?
What is the role of conflict?
lb. What is the fundamental character of one's political
opponents and of other significant political actors?
What is the nature of the opponent's goals?
What are the sources of the opponent's goals?
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Is the adversary's opposition permanent and general
or limited and specific?
How is the opponent likely to respond to our con-
ciliatory actions?
How is the opponent likely to respond to our poli-
cies of firmness?
What is the opponent's image of one's own nation?
What is the opponent's view of conflict?
What is the nature of the opponent's decision-
making process?
What is the opponent's "operational code?"
lc. What is the nature of the contemporary international
system?
Is the international system basically conflictual or
harmonious?
What are the sources of conflict?
What are the conditions of peace?
What is the structure of the contemporary inter-
national system?
How stable is the contemporary international system?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization
of one's fundamental political values and aspirations?
Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on
this score: and in what respects the one and/or the
other?
What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?
Should one be optimistic or pessimistic? About long
term goals? About specific undertakings?
Is the optimism or pessimism conditional?
On whose side is time?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense
and to what extent? What is the role of chance in
human affects and history?
Is political life capricious, or does it conform to
a more or less discernible pattern?
What aspects of political life are predictable or
unpredictable?
What degree of predictability exists in political
life?
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over
historical development? What is one's role in
"moving" and "shaping" history in the desired
direction?




1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or
objectives of political action?
How should one establish the goals for political
action?
Should one seek optimal goals or is it better to seek
satisfactory ones?
How many paths are there to the achievement of ulti-
mate goals?
How should one deal with value conflicts?
2. How are the goals of political action pursued most
effectively?
Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify,
substitute for, or abandon a goal?
What approaches should be used in the pursuit of goals?
Under what circumstances should one push harder, be
prepared to compromise, or retreat from a previously
held position?
Under what circumstances is unilateral action pre-
ferred?
Multilateral action?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated,
controlled, and accepted?
How are risks assessed?
What approach should be used to limit or control risk?
How should one deal with various types of tradeoffs
associated with risk?
Under what circumstances are high risk (or low risk)
policies mandatory? Permissible? Prohibited?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's
interests?
How important is timing in the achievement of major,
long-term aspirations?
How important is timing in the success of specific
policy undertakings?
When is action required, permitted or prohibited?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for
advancing one's interests? What resources can one
draw upon in the effort to advance one's interests?
What are the preferred tactics?
How is power conceptualized?
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This thesis proceeded along a quantitative path. The
frequency with which specific responses were given to each of
the operational code questions served as the measure of
importance. An acknowledged pitfall of using frequency as a
unit of enumeration is the inherent failure to consider inten-
sity, i.e., is the data from a routine banquet speech for a
Third World dignitary or is it from a major policy address?
In retrospect, this limitation posed no significant problem.
By and large, all statements were consciously chosen for pub-
lication and contained similar tones of intensity. Anomalies
created by intensity variations are addressed in a separate
chapter. The coding instructions were followed meticulously
document by document in order to minimize the researcher's
subjective predispositions and facilitate academic replication.
G. RELIABILITY
Reliability requires that "repeated measures with the same
instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar
results." (170:151) Reliability in this thesis was measured
by submitting a questionnaire containing five passages selected
from the material to ten coders . Four coders were National
Security Affairs students with some exposure to the opera-
tional code concept and knowledge of the Peoples Republic of
China. Three coders were Naval Postgraduate students in other
curricula. The other three coders were not affiliated at all
with the school. All coders had at least a Bachelor of Arts
or Bachelor of Science degree. The reliability questionnaire




This section provides the frequency distribution of coded
responses from Hua Guofeng speeches for each of the categories
in the operational code construct. An introduction is provided
for each category including a short synopsis of the question
involved and a description of each Holsti response typology.
All coded data was aggregated on a computer. Consequently,
all tables appearing in this section are computer generated.
Code in all cases represents a "no response" typology and is
therefore excluded (missing) in the computation of adjusted
and cumulative frequencies. As an example, in Table 2 86.9%
of all Hua's references to the nature of political life des-
cribed it as conflictual.
A. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
1. (a) What is the Essential Nature of the Political
Universe ?
Answers to this question are the bases for construct-
ing an actor's core beliefs concerning the characteristics of
politics, history, social life, the universe and human inter-
actions.
a. What is the Nature of Political Life?
An actor may believe that conflict is the normal
state of affairs, or conversely, that there is a basic harmony
among nations or a mixture of both. Typologies include:

















1. 53 86.9 86.9
2. 6 9.8 96.7
0. 46 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Chairman Hua clearly ascribes to the view of a conflictual
political universe. He continually refers to the world as
"... in an epoch of great upheaval" with "all the basic contra-
dictions sharpening." (43:7) This conflictual perception of
human interaction prevails both on the international level with
nations as the primary actors and on the domestic level with
classes as the primary actors. At the All-Army Political Work
Conference in May, 1978 he stated, "In our struggle to carry
out the general task for the new period, we face an external
threat from social-imperialism (USSR) and imperialism (US) as
well as complicated class struggle internally." (14:13)
This conflictual environment, according to Hua, is not likely
to dissipate soon. "... class struggle and the struggle between
the socialist and capitalist roads all exist and . . . this strug-
gle is protracted and complicated." (58:14) As evidence of
this belief Hua points to history stating that, "The road of
advance of human history is always tortuous." (1:5)
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b. What is the Nature of Conflict?
This category is designed to determine whether
an actor views conflict with or without a zero-sum orientation.
A zero-sum orientation entails a belief that the gain of one
participant is necessarily the loss of the other. A nonzero-
sum orientation views both parties as capable of gaining or los-
ing in a given situation. Alternatively , an actor may view
both zero-sum and nonzero-sum attributes of conflict as rele-
vant depending upon the situation. Typologies include: 1)





CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
1. 4 100.0 100.0




Although rarely addressed, it is not surprising that Chair-
man Hua, being a Communist leader, would overwhelmingly view
conflict as a zero-sum interaction. Marxist ideology stresses
the all or nothing consequences of the communist-capitalist
confrontation. "It is a life and death struggle between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie and on its outcome hinges the
future and destiny of ... our country." (49:25) This zero-sum
orientation dictates only one feasible solution to China's
internal struggle, "towards the national bourgeoisie, our policy
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is to eliminate it as a class." (58:35)
c. What is the Scope of Conflict?
At issue here is the extent to which issues are
linked. An actor may view all issues as being linked to one
fundamental conflict. They may be viewed as independent and
separate. An actor may view the issues as separate, but closely
related with a high potential for conflict spillover from issue
to issue. Typologies include: 1) All issues are linked


















Data in this category has proven contradictory and incon-
clusive. Chairman Hua has on occasion implied that political
conflicts, irregardless of their particular structures, are
but an expression of an overriding all-encompassing class
struggle. For example, "... the concrete class struggle and
two-line struggle on all fronts (of endeavor)." (34:A12)
At other times, he divorces existing issues of contention
and agreement from ideological linkages. "True, China and the
United States have different social systems and ideologies
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and there are differences of principle on quite a number of
issues; however, our two countries have many points in common
in the world today." (1:5)
d. What is the Role of Conflict in Historical
Development?
In this category the subject's views concerning
the utility of conflict are examined. He may believe that con-
flict is necessary for the achievement of goals and is therefore
valuable in and of itself. Conflict may be considered costly,
but nonetheless helpful in achieving goals (functional) . Alter-
natively, conflict may be viewed as an obstacle to the achieve-
ment of goals and therefore dysfunctional. Typologies include:
1) Necessary 2) Functional 3) Dysfunctional.
TABLE 5
ROLE OF CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
CATEGORY LABEL
NECESSARY
TOTAL 107 10 0.0
Chairman Hua firmly believes that conflict is a necessary
prerequisite for the realization of China's primary goals. In
the concluding remarks of his Report on the Work of the Govern-
ment, delivered at the First Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress, Hua cautions the audience that they must





CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
1. 12 100.0 100.0
0. 95 MISSING 100.0

Regarding the international scene, Hua stresses that,
"Resolute struggle should be waged against the schemes of
social-imperialism and expansionists for aggression and sub-
version." (68:J8) He extends his belief in the necessity of
conflict to numerous political situations throughout the world.
In referring to Africa for example, Hua states that the South
African SOWETO "massacre" "... stresses the need for continuing
the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, white
racism, Zionism and big-power hegemonism." (43:7) In his
references to domestic struggle, Chairman Hua continually
emphasizes that "it is imperative for the proletariat to per-
sist in its struggle ..." (49:31)
1. (b) What is the Fundamental Character of one's
Political Opponents and of other Significant
Political Actors ?"
a. What are the Adversary's Basic Goals and
Aspirations?
If the opponent is believed to harbor unlimited
aspirations such as hegemony, the destruction or radical trans-
formation of the International System, conquest and enslavement,
et cetera, he is considered destructionist. An aggressive,
opportunistic opponent whose goals fall short of destruction is
considered expansionist. A defensive opponent is one concerned
with its own security and maintenance of the status quo. An
adversary may be viewed as conciliatory if a willingness to
undertake at least limited accommodation is communicated. An
active seeker of peace is prepared to undertake major peace
initiatives and concessions. Typologies include: 1) Destruc-
tionist 2) Expansionist 3) Defensive 4) Conciliatory
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1. 27 55.1 55.1
2. 21 42.9 98.0
3. 1 2.0 100.0
0. 58 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Premier Hua is very clear and adamant about the basis of
his opponents 1 goals. As can readily be seen, Hua overwhelm-
ingly categorizes his opponents as either destructionist or
expansionist with a fairly even split. The split predominantly
corresponds to his referencing the Soviet Union as destruction-
ist and the United States as expansionist. It must be noted,
however, that a downward trend in the category continuum in
the case of the United States has occurred over time. Appendix
C presents a year by year comparison of responses referencing
the United States and the Soviet Union. The following quotes
are a random sampling of Hua's pointed beliefs concerning
United States and USSR goals:
"In particular, the superpower that is most vociferous
for "detente," (USSR) in its quest for world hegemony,
is deliberately squeezing into every opening and mak-
ing trouble and carrying out expansion everywhere."
(46:4)
"Internationally ... the Soviet Union and the United




"The Soviet revisionists are bent on subjugating our
country." (49:53)
"While one superpower has been forced to contract, the
other superpower (USSR) has grabbed the chance to
step up its infiltration and expansion in the Asian
Pacific region in an attempt to bring it into its
sphere of influence." (48:11)
"That imperialism which flaunts the signboard of social-
ism has reached out its grasping hands everywhere and
carried out rabid expansion." (1:5)
b. What are the Sources of the Opponent's Goals?
This category can be subdivided into two theo-
retical views. The first is the belief that an adversary's
behavior is generated by its own characteristics such as
ideology, historical goals, internal needs and leadership traits
The other view assumes that external forces such as, traditional
power politics, or external pressure are the driving sources.
Typologies include: 1) Ideology 2) History 3) Internal
Needs 4) Leader 5) Power Politics 6) External.
TABLE 7















1. 5 27.8 27.8
2. 7 38.9 66.7
3. 2 11.1 77.8
4. 4 22.2 100.0




Chairman Hua perceives several sources simultaneously driv-
ing the selection and pursuit of opponents' goals. He refers
to history as a precedent for present goals. "Today's big-
power hegemonism have always wanted to invade and control this
country of strategic importance and long history (Egypt)."
(45:8) Ideology also contributes rather heavily to the Super-
power's aggressive goals. "Imperialism (and social imperialism)
means aggression." (49:40) Leadership is addressed as a source
only in the case of the Soviet Union whose "revisionist clique
... (is) perpetrating aggression and expansion abroad." (49:42)
Classic power politics is cited repeatedly as a source of
world problems. The United States and Soviet Union are locked
in "contention for world domination and frantically push their
policies of aggression and war." (58:36)
c. What is the Generality of the Adversaries'
Hostility or Opposition?
This category centers around the actor ' s percep-
tion of the opponents ' hostility as being either broad basic
differences upon which single policy initiatives would have no
appreciable effect or, based on issues of a specific nature.
The latter view implies that the hostility is limited to the
period of time required to resolve the issue. Typologies

















1. 16 84.2 84.2
2. 3 15.8 100.0
0. 88 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Chairman Hua tends to view conflict with all opponents as
permanent and of an all-encompassing and ideologically based
nature. "So long as social imperialism and imperialism exist,
war is inevitable." (58:36) Another indication of this per-
manency is evidenced by Hua's belief that "the superpowers
will never be reconciled to their defeat." (45:8) Not only
does Hua perceive the hostility to be of a permanent nature,
he views the situation to be uncontrollable. The fact that,
in his opinion, the superpowers want war, "... is determined
by their imperialist nature and is therefore independent of
man's will. Imperialism means aggression, aggression means
war." (49:40)
d. What is the Likely Response to the Adversary
to Our Conciliatory Moves?
The opponent may respond to a conciliatory initia-
tive by reciprocating within the confines of the particular issue
or may reciprocate in other areas. The opponent may simply ig-
nore the initiative. Interpreting the initiative as a sign of
weakness, the opponent may take the opportunity to register
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a quick gain in the field of that specific issue or in another
area. Typologies include: 1) Reciprocate in this situation
2) Reciprocate in other situations 3) Ignore 4) Take
advantage in this situation 5) Take advantage in other
situations.
TABLE 9













3. 1 50.0 50.0
5. 1 50.0 100.0
0. 105 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Premier Hua feels that any attempt at conciliation will be
either ignored or taken advantage of. In his most pointed ad-
dress on this subject, Hua cites historical precedent as a clear
demonstration of the folly of appeasement. "There is a trend
towards appeasement among those people in the West who cherish
the illusion that peace can be maintained through compromises
and concessions and some even want to follow in Chamberlain's
footsteps and try to divert the peril of the new Tzars towards
the East. In so doing they will merely abet the expansionist
ambitions of the Soviet revisionists and hasten the outbreak
of war." (49:40)
e. What is the Likely Response of the Adversary to
Our Policy of Firmness?
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An actor can anticipate an opponent taking one
of five possible responses. He may back down. Working under
his own firm timetable, he may just ignore the new stance. An
opponent may reciprocate with a firmer stance with respect to
that particular issue or on some other issue. Being forced
into a corner by the new policy of firmness, he may respond
impulsively. Typologies include: 1) Back down 2) Ignore
3) Reciprocate in this situation 4) Reciprocate in other
situations 5) Respond impulsively.
TABLE 10
RESPONSE TO POLICIES OF FIRMNESS
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
BACK DOWN 1. 2 40 40
RESPOND IMPULSIVELY 5. 3 60 100
0. 187 MISSING 100
TOTAL 192 100
Chairman Hua maintains that a policy of firmness would be
handled inadequately by an opponent. In Africa, for example,
Hua perceives a policy of firmness and show of force by national
liberation forces as evoking careless, impulsive action on the
part of South Africa and Rhodesia: "They (Vorster and Smith)
are putting up a desperate struggle." (44:5) Hua is fairly
adamant in his belief that his opponents, especially the super-
powers, would be forced to back down if confronted. He con-
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tinually characterizes the United States and the Soviet Union,
in particular, as being "paper tigers." "Wildly ambitious but
inwardly weak, it (USSR) does not have enough strength to match
its desires. It bullys the soft and fears the tough." (48:11)
He believes that, "any country, be it big or small can withstand
foreign threats ... if it defies tyranny and dares to wage
struggle." (48:11)
f. What is the Opponent's View of Conflict?
This category has two dimensions. The first con-
cerns the inevitability of conflict and the second concerns its
desirability. Typologies include: la) Inevitable lb) Avoid-
able 2a) Desirable 2b) Undesirable.
TABLE 11
OPPONENTS VIEW OF CONFLICT
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
INEVITABLE 1. 4 57.1 57.1





As the above table illustrates, Chairman Hua perceives
that his opponents believe conflict is not only inevitable, but
desirable. Hua believes that war is inevitable because of the
existence of imperialism and social-imperialism, yet he per-
ceives both the United States and the Soviet Union as purpose-
fully planning upon war.
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"They (US and USSR) work overtime to preach 'detente' and
'disarmament' with no other purpose than to fool people and hide
their arms expansion and war preparations." (58:36) More dir-
ectly, he says, "It is not the people of different countries or
the people of China but the superpowers that want war." (49:40)
Hua goes on to say that not only is war inevitable, but at
least in the case of the Soviet Union, conflict is a desirable
route to the attainment of goals: "The Soviet Union relies
mainly on its military power to carry out expansion." (58:36)
g. What are the Opponent's Decision-Making
Processes?
There are two dimensions to this category. The
first concerns the actor's perception of which of Alison's
three models best portrays the adversary's decision-making
process. (155) The second deals with whether the opponent be-
haves in a calculating manner or acts impulsively. Typologies
include: 1) Model I (unitary rational actor) 2) Model II
(organizational processes) 3) Model III (bureaucratic politics)





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
MODEL 3 3. 8 100.0 100.0




Premier Hua rarely discusses the internal decision-making
processes of his antagonists except in the case of the Soviet
Union. All references in this category are pointed at "the
Soviet revisionist renegade clique," (49:42) who happen to be
controlling the Soviet Union at the present time. It is this
leading clique which has "brought about the degeneration of
the Soviet Union" (49:41) and "stubbornly clings to a policy
of hostility towards China." (58:39) Hua uses the term clique
freely as synonomous with faction (for example, the Chiang
Kai-shek clique, Pak Chong-hui clique, et cetera) which by
definition, implies the existence of alternative factions.
h. What is the Opponent's Approach to the Choice
of Objectives?
There are four dimensions to this category. The
first dimension distinguishes between the perception of an adver-
sary as an optimizer (maximize goals) or a sufficer. The sec-
ond is concerned with the realistic nature or attainability of
an opponent's goals. The third dimension examines the opponent's
flexibility with regard to goal setting while the fourth di-
mension deals with its predictability. Typologies include:
1) Optimize 2) Suffice la) Realistic 2a) Unrealistic















1. 5 31.3 31.3
4. 4 25.0 56.3
5. 1 6.3 62.5
6. 5 31.3 93.8
7. 1 6.3 100.0








Chairman Hua clearly perceives the superpowers as using an
optimizing strategy and repeatedly refers, to their desire to
"dominate the world." (49:40) He believes that their goals are
unrealistic because they lack the resolve and power to reach
them. "Though wildly ambitious, it (USSR) is essentially flabby
Like all imperialists/ it is but a paper tiger, outwardly
strong but inwardly weak, and fierce of visage but faint of
heart." (46:4) He characterizes some Soviet goals as "pure
daydreaming" (49:47) and "nothing but a pipe dream." (58:39)
On the topic of flexibility Hua contradicts himself. On the
one hand he cites the flexibility of the Soviet Union's
chameleon- like tendency to try many tactics to achieve a goal,
"Although a certain superpower flaunts all kinds of banners
and shifts various tactics ..." (32:A6) Hua states, however,
that when faced with setbacks in a given arena, the superpowers
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just continue along the same path: "... unreconciled to their
reverses, the two hegemonist powers are intensifying their con-
tention for world domination and frantically pushing their
policies of aggression and war." (58:36)
i. How Does an Opponent Pursue Objectives?
An opponent may pursue objectives by making care-
ful preparations (prepare ground) or he may take action as a
way of testing its feasibility (try and see) . An opponent may
utilize a bit by bit approach, settling for small gains along
the way (incremental) or he may believe in full scale all-out
pursuit (blitzkrieg)
. Typologies include: 1) Prepare ground
2) Try and see 3) Incremental 4) Blitzkrieg.
The results in this category fail to demonstrate
any consistent trends. Hua fails to clearly address this issue,
but he implies a Blitzkrieg strategy: "The Soviet revisionists
are working overtime to push their global 'offensive strategy'."
(49:40) He refers on several occasions to "possible surprise
attack from the enemy." (14:10) In other passages Hua uses
the term muddling which, according to Charles E. Lindbloom,
(181) is synonomous with incrementalism. "The superpowers are
finding it more and more difficult to muddle along." (47:7)
l.c) What is the Nature of the Contemporary International
System?
Answers to this question serve as the basis for
ascertaining an actor's core beliefs concerning the make-up
and functional utility of the current international situation.













1. 64 91.4 91.4
2. 6 8.6 100.0
0. 37 MISSING 100.0
The international system may be viewed as
follows: dominated by conflictual relations among nations, one
in which mutual interests prevail and therefore predominantly
harmonious, or some mixture of both due to geographic or
economic variations. Typologies include: 1) Conflictual
2) Mixed 3) Harmonious.
TABLE 14





It is not at all surprising that Chairman Hua would view
the present international situation within the framework of
his perceptions of the general political universe. He clearly
believes that conflict not only thrives on today's interna-
tional scene but is its foremost characteristic.
Hua repeatedly refers to the world today as one which is
"far from tranquil" (8:9) and "characterized by great disorder
under heaven." (48:11) The root of this conflict is also not
surprising. "The superpowers are contending fiercely for
world hegemony. They are the main cause of intranquility in
the world." (35:A12) Hua believes that not only does conflict
exist, it is intensifying.
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"But we cannot fail to see that imperialism and hegemon-
ism, locked in their rivalry for world hegemony, are
engaged in fervid arms expansion and war preparations
and are carrying out aggression and expansion everywhere,
posing a grave threat to peace and to the security of
all countries . .
. The series of incidents which have
occurred in the Near and Middle East and in Africa and
Asia clearly demonstrate that their contention is daily
intensifying and that the factors for war are visibly
growing." (5:14)
b. What are the Basic Sources of Conflict?
This question incorporates the three level dis-
tinction developed by Waltz (19 59) in his analysis of explana-
tions for war. (192)
First, the major source of conflict may be found
in some basic element of human nature and may therefore be
relatively permanent. Second, it may be rooted in differences
of principle or ideology. Third, it may arise from specific
issues. Typologies include: 1) Human nature 2a) National
Attributes; Ideology 2b) National Attributes; Political
2c) National Attributes; Economic 3a) International System;
Ideology 3b) International System; Nationalism 3c) Inter-
national System; Economic 3d) International System; Power
Politics.
Hua perceives two causal dimensions at the root of inter-
national conflict: nationalism and standard power politics.
Both dimensions are related because of the role played in each
by the superpowers. In essence, the first dimension views
today's conflict from the perspective of superpower imperialism
over the Third World, while the latter dimension views conflict




















3. 1 1.4 1.4
4. 6 8.3 9.7
5. 27 37.5 47.2
6. 4 5.6 52.8
7. 32 44.4 97.2
8. 2 2.8 100.0
0. 35 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Hua sees the struggle of the Third World against imperial-
ism as "a glorious tradition" (34:A11) and a united effort.
Not only is nationalism and anti-imperialism an honored and
necessary effort, it is an irresistible development. "Countries
want independence, nations want liberation and the people want
revolution — this trend of history is surging forward irresist-
ibly." (35:A12)
According to Hua, the primary source of world conflict is
superpower rivalry: " ... rivalry between ... the Soviet Union
and the United States and their contradictions with the people
of all lands have become particularly acute, constituting the
central problem in international relations today." (58:35)
This contention "extends all over the globe" (46:4) and there-
fore affects all countries either directly, as in Africa where
it "constitutes the main danger to the independence and security
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of the African countries," (44:5) or indirectly, with the
growing threat of war: ... the continuation of this rivalry
is bound to lead to a new world war." (48:11)
c. What are the Conditions of Peace?
Responses to this self-evident question can
cover a wide range. 0. R. Holsti, in devising the code, pre-
dicted that most responses would focus on three categories:
the individual (better education or communication among parti-
cipants to suppress misunderstanding) , the nation (eliminate
or transform a specific nation or change in some other way the
attributes of a nation) and the international system (eliminate
inequalities such as, resources, standards of living, maintain
a balance of power or transform basic features of the inter-
national system). (175:59) Consequently, typologies include:
1) Education/Communication 2) Eliminate Offending Nation (s)
3) Eliminate Inequalities 4) Balance of Power 5) Transform





CATEGORY LAVEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
EDUC-COM 1. 4 9.1 9.1
ELIM OFFEND NATION 2. 1 2.3 11.4
ELIM INEQUALITY 3. 11 25.0 36.4
BALANCE OF POWER 4. 28 63.6 100.0




Hua refers only to conditions of temporary peace. Perman-
ent peace is presumed to necessitate the demise of capitalism,
but this is never specifically stated. Only one reference
lends support to this assumption and that is, "So long as social
imperialism and imperialism exist, war is inevitable." (58:36)
Speaking of temporary peace, then, Hua cites three general
contributing approaches toward its attainment. Each approach
seems to be applicable toward peace on a different level along
the friendly to hostile relations ladder. The first is com-
munication. Hua believes that among friends, conflicts can be
resolved through open communication, stating that, " ... should
differences arise, they (socialist countries) should seek a
solution through friendly consultation." (58:37) Other aspects
of communication include state visits and various exchange
programs. "This visit by his excellency the prime minister
(Lee Kuan Yew) is of benefit to promoting the friendship be-
tween the peoples of China and Singapore and the mutual under-
standing between our two countries." (78:A7)
Up a notch on the ladder of conflict, Hua implies that one
can only hope to establish and maintain peace through mutual
adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
"It has been our consistent desire to develop friendly
relations and co-operation with all countries on the
basis of the five principles of mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence. We have always held that there must




It must be noted that references to the Five Principles
were only made in conjunction with the following countries:
Australia, New Zealand, North Korea, Laos, Nepal, Western
Samoa, Pakistan, Romania and South Asian countries in general.
It is presumed, therefore, that temporary peace among un-
friendly or hostile countries (for example, with superpowers
and others who fail to heed the five principles) requires the
third approach: balance of power. By balance of power, Hua
envisions a united Third World (including China) which will
effectively oppose superpower hegemonism. Hua repeatedly ad-
dresses the importance of unity which is the key to the balance
"In face of the stark reality of the growing danger of
war, the people of the whole world (Third World) must
heighten their vigilance, strengthen their unity and
resolutely oppose superpower hegemonism." (48:11)
Hua also makes reference to the desirability of a united
Europe in his balance of power scheme. "We also hope to see
a united and powerful Europe." (58:38)
d. What is the Structure of the International
System?
This category is concerned with the actor's
perception of the international system as being basically
polarized in nature, with two centers of decision, or plural-














1. 1 4.2 4.2
2. 23 95.8 100.0





Although Hua views superpower contention as the greatest
source of turmoil in today's international environment, he no
longer perceives the environment to be polarized along the
standard lines of capitalist-socialist, US-USSR, East-West.
Hua is a great advocate of the nonaligned and Third World
movements. He cites the growth in the number of nonaligned
countries as proof of a collapsing polarism and emerging
pluralism.
"Today the non-aligned movement has become a very import-
ant force in the struggle of the world's people against
imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. This is exact-
ly why some people regard the non-aligned movement as a
grave obstacle to their pursuance of the policy of ag-
gression and expansion. They are doing their utmost to
undermine the unity of the non-aligned movement, change
its orientation and subordinate it to their hegemonist
aims." (5:14)
Hua ' s numerous references to the need for, and power of a
united Third World, and comments concerning a united Europe
were addressed in the previous category. Let it suffice to
say here that his strong advocacy of united fronts also re-
inforces his belief in a pluralistic international structure.
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It is interesting to note, however, that Hua often lumps the
United States and the Soviet Union together as imperialists,
superpowers, hegemonists and the "common enemy." (61:3) He
does this so routinely that a case can be made in saying that
Hua really has merely rearranged the polar structure from the
classic East-West orientation to the have-have nots or hege-
monists-third world polarization. If given the complete Third
World unity for which he preaches, and increased United States-
Soviet Union cooperation, such a polarization might ensue, but
it has not yet and probably will not.
e. How Stable is the International System?
This category examines the relationships of
issues within the international system. Does the actor view
the current issues as all a part of some larger fundamental
conflict or are they separate? If separate, are they so
closely related that a high potential for "spillover" exists?
Typologies include: 1) All Issues are Linked 2) High Spill-





CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
ALL ISSUES LINKED 1. 8 72.7 72.7
2. 3 27.3 100.0




In the context of international relations, Chairman Hua
tends to view all current conflicts as small manifestations
of a larger, historical conflict: imperialism versus the
underdeveloped. He refers to isolated geographical struggles
as part of the struggle waged by ALL countries against imperial-
ism. "Their (Third World countries) just struggles, in coor-
dination with those of the people of other countries, are
pounding away at the old order." (35:A12)
2. What are the Prospects for the Eventual Realization
of One's Fundamental Political Values and
Aspirations ?
Answers to this question provide the basis for ascer-
taining the role which optimism plays in the actor's core belief
system.
a. What is the Nature of One's Fundamental Goals?
This category is limited to assertions about
major long range goals and closely parallels the typology used
for beliefs about the adversary's goals. (Philosophical Belief
P-l(b) category.) Typologies include: 1) Destructionist
2) Expansionist 3) Defensive 4) Conciliatory 5) Active
Seeker of Peace.
It is not at all surprising that Hua would view China as
having defensive long range goals, given China's history over
the last two centuries and Hua ' s perception of the Soviet Union
as destructionist. For the last two hundred years China has
had little positive control over her own resources in her rela-
tions with the "imperialist" West. Present Soviet goals are
viewed as a continuation of this past: "The Soviet revision-

















CONCILIATORY 4. 5 9.1 85.5
MODERNIZE-SOCIALISM 6. 8 14.5 100.0
0. 52 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Consequently, Hua is very consistent in his references to
China's defensive orientation. It is important to note that
there is an important distinction between defensive and concilia-
tory. As pointed out in a previous category, Hua is adamantly
against any form of appeasement. In a defensive orientation,
the search for security may lead to the infringement of the
security (or even the sovereignty) of others, for example,
Taiwan.
The first aspect of Hua ' s defensive goals concerns prevent-
ing Soviet (and United States) expansion, specifically at China's
expense, but also on a global scale. "We are determined to
combat superpower hegemonism and upset hegemonist world stra-
tegic plans so as to put off the outbreak of a world war and
defend world peace." (30:E8) To reaffirm China's defensive
posture, Hua states that China is "firmly opposed to big
nations bullying small ones and strong nations bullying weak
ones." (47:7) Equating the term superpower with, among other
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things, hegemonist drives, he repeatedly declares that, "She
(China) will not be a superpower, neither now nor ever in the
future." (35:A12)
The second aspect of Hua's defensive position concerns
China's second avowed goal to "turn China into a great, power-
ful and modern socialist country by the end of the century."
(8:9) In order to accomplish this goal, Hua believes that
China needs "a prolonged peaceful international environment
to build our country and improve the living standards of our
people." (6:9) This reinforces the urgency and preeminence of
"opposing the hegemony of the two superpowers ..." (18:27)
for, as asserted in category l.(b) c, Hua believes that there
can be no peace while the superpowers are free to pursue their
expansionist policies.
b. Should One be Optimistic or Pessimistic Regard-
ing the Pursuit of Goals?
Typologies include: 1) Optimistic, Unqualified
2) Optimistic, Qualified (conditioned on certain actions or















1. 19 59.4 59.4
2. 13 40.6 100.0




Any good leader should probably voice publically, at least,
great optimism and Chairman Hua does this. His optimism is
consistently based upon a few set factors: 1) the correctness
of the Maoist line 2) the superiority of socialism 3) the
resourcefulness of the Chinese people 4) historical precedent.
The distinction between optimism unqualified and optimism
qualified does not appear to be significant because most refer-
ences to qualifying circumstances are very general in nature:
for example, providing China learns "from foreign countries all
their advanced experience" (4:15) or providing China carries
out "the political line, policies, principles and methods of work
formulated by Chairman Mao." (39:18) The following quotes cap-
ture the tone and assuredness of Hua's optimism:
"Of course there will be difficulties ahead and arduous
efforts are needed to surmount them. But there is no
reason at all to be apathetic — to underestimate the
favorable conditions, be pessimistic and think that
this or that is impossible." (58:19)
"No difficulties whatsoever can stop the Chinese
people from marching forward towards our set goal."
(12:16)
"Our goal can unquestionably be attained." (8:9)
"Historical experience shows that anyone who attempts
to play the hegemonic overlord in the world will be
'lifting a rock only to drop it on his own feet' and
will eventually end up in failure." (79:5)
"No matter how desperately they (superpowers) may
struggle, they will not escape their ultimate
doom." (47:7)
Hua explains his own optimism by saying, "We are revolutionary




c. To what does the optimism/pessimism refer:
Typologies include: 1) Long term goals 2)
Policy undertaking.
TABLE 21










LONGTERM GOALS 1. 30 93.8 93.8
POLICY UNDERTAKING 2. 2 6.3 100.0
0. 75 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
The fact that over 90% of Hua's optimistic assertions are
in reference to long term goals is misleading given that Hua
rarely addresses specific policy undertakings. The vast
majority of optimistic assertions deal with containment and/or
demise of the hegemonists and the Four Modernizations.
"
... superpower (USSR) , whose trouble-making is doomed
to failure." (46:4)
"Socialist China will surely flourish and become power-
ful, the goal of the four modernizations will certainly
be attained." (11:5)
d. On whose side is time?















1. 17 100.0 100.0
0. 90 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Chairman Hua believes that time is on China's (and the Third
World's) side for two reasons. First, Hua perceives the inter-
national environment to be changing in his favor: "the inter-
national situation is developing in a direction most favourable
to the people of all countries but unfavourable to imperialism
and hegemonism. " (47:7) It is favorable because liberation
struggles are on the rise and "the international united front
against ... the superpowers is broadening." (49:40) Hence, with
the passage of time, China's position, (and that of the Third
World in general), improves vis-a-vis the superpowers'. Sec-
ond, Hua realizes that China is still underdeveloped and there-
fore, at a disadvantage via-a-vis the Soviet Union, in particular
Although Hua speaks of "racing against time to strengthen
ourselves economically and heighten our defensive capabilities,"
(58:14) it is clear that the passage of time means the oppor-




3. Is the Political Future Predictable ?
Answers to this question serve as the basis for
identifying the actor's core beliefs concerning the role of
history and chance in human affairs.
a. Is Political Life Capricious or Predictable?
Typologies include: 1) Predictable
2) Capricious.
TABLE 23
IS THE POLITICAL FUTURE PREDICTABLE
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
PREDICTABLE 1. 12 100.0 100.0
0. 95 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Hua clearly believes that political life is predictable.
He is a firm believer of dialectics and Marxian evolution and
therefore the major trends of history are predictable. War,
for example, is not only predictable it is irresistible.
"Their (superpowers) rivalry will lead to a conflagration some
day. This is independent of man's will." (7:21)
b. What Aspects of Political Life are Predictable?
Typologies include: 1) Historical Development
2) State of the International System 3) Opponent's Behavior














HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1. 24 72.7 72.7
POLICY OUTCOME 4. 2 6.1 78.8
WAR 5. 7 21.2 100.0
0. 74 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Historical development is clearly the most predictable
aspect of political life. Hua continually refers to historical
development as an indisputable and known law.
"Judging by the laws of historical development, aggres-
sion bears the seed of defeat, and the aggressors are
inevitably punished by history." (6:9)
The following quotes capture the intensity of Hua's belief
in the existence of a law of historical development and hence,
its predictability.
"This (socialism) is an inexorable trend of history and
no reactionary forces can hold it back." (58:40)
"
... the historical destiny of the dictatorship of the
proletariat." (18:19)
c. What is the Degree of Predictability?


















1. 26 96.3 96.3
2. 1 3.7 100.0
0. 80 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Hua predominantly uses one of six phrases which optimize
the concept of certainty when referring to the predictability
of political life: 1) "Never" 2) "Inevitably" 3) Irresist-
able" 4) "Inexorable" 5) "Independent of man's will"
6) "Always."
For example: "However strong and mighty the aggressors may
seem for the moment, the end result is always contrary to their
expectations, and they will never escape their doom." (6:9)
4. How Much Control or Mastery Can One Have Over
Historical Development ?
Answers to this question provide the basis for con-
structing an actor's core beliefs concerning a leader's role
in manipulating the course of history.
a. What is the Role of the Leader?
A leader may actively use politics to guide
historical development. He may merely intervene when feasible.
Perhaps, his role is one of mediator between contending forces
or simply one of identification of major trends in historical
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development. It is equally possible that a leader should avoid
any intervention in historical development. Typologies include:
1) Actively Use Politics 2) Intervene When Feasible 3) Me-
diate Between Contending Forces 4) Discern Historical Trends
5) Avoid Intervention 6) Control Uncertain, But Must Act.
TABLE 26
ROLE OF LEADER IN SHAPING HISTORY
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
ACTIVE 1. 16 100.0 100.0
0. 91 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 107 100.0
Given Hua's firm beliefs concerning the predictability of
historical development, it is not surprising to find that he
views a leader's role as one of active participation. One has
to look no further than Hua's predecessor, Mao Tse-tung, to find
one of the foremost advocates of developmental control. Mao
believed in dialectics, and that through careful applications
of antithesis, a leader could guide history. (131:89) One such
example was the cultural revolution. Hua speaks of this event
and Mao's position in it as follows: "In the light of the
historical lesson of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union
and the real danger of such a restoration in China, Chairman
Mao . . . prersonally launched and led the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution." (49:38) It must be noted, however, that
almost all references in this category are in praise laden
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descriptions of Mao as a leader. The frequency of these refer-
ences decreases over time.
B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
1. What is the Best Approach for Selecting Goals or
Objectives for Political Action ?
Answers to this question serve as the basis for ascer-
taining an actor's core beliefs regarding the selection of/ and
interrelationships between political goals.
a. How Should One Establish the Goals for Political
Action?
A leader may ascribe to one of three general ap-
proaches: 1) a comprehensive framework or blueprint which will
delineate precisely how to attain major aspirations, 2) a piece-
meal approach which allows the leader to separate issues and
evaluate the opportunities afforded by each, independently and
3) some mixture of both of the above. Typologies include:
1) Comprehensive Framework 2) Mixed Strategy 3) Individual
Issues.
TABLE 27




As would be expected from an avowed Communist, Chairman
Hua refers to the necessity of a comprehensive framework for
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
1. 40 100.0 100.0
0. 143 MISSING 100.0
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establishing and achieving goals. To Hua, the concept of a
framework or master plan is synonomous with his use of the term
"line." All activities, whether political, economic, military
or social are guided and directed by "the line." In 1963, he
first referred to "the general line for building socialism"
(52:8) and although the nature of the "line" may have changed
from time to time, the necessity for having one and following
it has been consistent. Most references are to "Chairman Mao's
revolutionary line" (12:16) which carefully outlined everything
from foreign policy (The Differentiation of the Three Worlds)
to agriculture. More recently, the line is referred to as "the
line of the 11th Party Congress." (30:7)
b. What is the Nature of the Goals to be Sought?
Goals may be optimal or feasible. The former views
the compromising of major goals to achieve short term gains as
running the risk of losing any chance for the attainment of
the major goal. The latter states that it is more appropriate
to advance toward a major goal one step at a time. Consequently,
it is permissible to subdivide a major goal into a sequence of




NATURE OF GOALS TO BE SOUGHT
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
OPTIMAL 1. 8 66.7 66.7







Several of the preceding conclusions are applicable to this
category. Because Hua views political interaction with a zero-
sum perspective, is adamantly opposed to any form of appease-
ment and tends to be highly optimistic about long term success,
it is not surprising that he would favor optimal goals. A case
in point is Taiwan. Hua is adamant about its return and opposes
any compromise on the issue even if it would generate economic
concessions from the United States. "The Chinese people are
determined to liberate Taiwan. When and how is entirely China's
internal affair, an internal affair which brooks no foreign
interference whatsoever. If relations between the two countries
(PRC-US) are to be normalized, the United States must ... (do
the things she ultimately has done)." (58:39)
c. What are the Paths to the Achievement of Goals?
Any actor may believe that there is only one correct
path to success from which any deviation could well prove dis-
astrous. Conversely, an actor may see multiple paths as provid-
ing various degrees of probability for success. Typologies
include: 1) Single Correct Path 2) Multiple Paths.
TABLE 2 9






CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
1. 72 93.5 93.5
2. 5 6.5 100.0




Chairman Hua believes in the necessity of following the
"line" in the pursuit of all goals, whether domestic or inter-
national. He refers to Mao as having "formulated the only-
correct line, principles and policies for each stage of the
Chinese revolution." (18:15) This "correctness" is contin-
ually reasserted. " all this forcefully testifies to the
complete correctness of the strategic decision adopted by the
Party Central Committee." (15:10) Not only does Hua consider
the "line" to be the only correct one, he believes that it
must be rigidly followed. "Both internally and internationally
we must unswervingly forge ahead along the course chartered
by Chairman Hua." (53:44)
d. Do Value Conflicts Exist in the Pursuit of Goals?
This is essentially a question concerning the need
for major goal tradeoffs. If the leader perceives two or more
goals as incapable of simultaneous achievement, some degree of
tradeoff is necessary. If all goals are perceived as compat-
ible and/or reinforcing, no tradeoff is required. Typologies
include: 1) All Goals Compatible 2) Tradeoffs Necessary.
TABLE 3
COPING WITH VALUE CONFLICTS
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
ALL GOALS COMPATIBLE 1. 2 100.0 100.0
0. 181 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 18 3 100.0
81

Data for this category is inconclusive. The only ob-
servation which can reasonably be made is that Hua avoids
addressing any existing value conflicts. Whether this is a
result of a belief that none actually exists, or is a con-
scious avoidance of the subject, cannot be ascertained.
2. How are the Goals of Action Pursued Most Effectively ?
Answers to this question provide the basis for ascer-
taining an actor's core beliefs concerning the operationaliza-
tion of political goals.
a. What Approach Should be Used in the Pursuit of Goals?
An actor may pursue goals by making careful prepara-
tions (prepare ground) or he may take action as a way of testing
its feasibility (try and see) . An actor may utilize a bit by
bit approach, settling for small gains along the way (incre-
mental) or he may believe in full scale all out pursuit (blitz-
krieg) . Typologies include: 1) Prepare Ground 2) Try and
See) 3) Incremental 4) Blitzkrieg.
TABLE 31
APPROACH TO PURSUIT OF GOALS
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
PREPARE GROUND 1. 20 74.1 74.1
TRY-AND-SEE 2. 1 3.7 77.8
INCREMENTAL APPROACH 3. 5 18.5 96.3
BLITZKRIEG 4. 1 3.7 100.0
0. 156 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 18 3 100.0
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Premier Hua tends to favor the prior preparation approach
to the pursuit of international goals. Because the spread of
hegemonism and the threat of war are the international issues
of primary concern to Hua, he refers repeatedly to the neces-
sity for preparation. " ... we must be prepared for any pos-
sible contingency." (57:E12) To Hua, unpreparedness means
vulnerability. "We believe that the outbreak of war can be
put off, but then the people of all countries must ... prepare
against all eventualities. In this way, even if the super-
powers gamble with war, the people of the world will not be
caught in a vulnerable state of unpreparedness." (58:36)
When addressing domestic goals, however, Hua often refer-
ences the incremental approach. He speaks of "a step by step
improvement in the people's material well-being and cultural
life" (10:9) and of "(reaching) our goals (modernization by
2000) step by step." (10:15)
b. Under What Circumstances Should One Push Harder,
Be Prepared to Compromise, or to Retreat from a
Previously Held Position?
The major thrust of this category concerns broad
range strategy concepts rather than specific strategy applica-
tions (which are addressed in instrumental belief #5) . Typo-
logies include: 1) Push Harder 2) Accommodate 3) Pull
Back. Because Hua refers only to circumstances and general
strategy concepts related to pushing harder, the data was
aggregated around the most cited circumstances: 1) unity














UNITY 1. 6 54.5 54.5
ANTI APPEASEMENT 2. 2 18.2 72.7
WAR PREPARATIONS 3. 1 9.1 81.8
RESOLUTE STRUGGLE 4. 2 18.2 100.0
0. 172 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 18 3 100.0
Because Hua is "opposed to appeasement/' (30:E8) it is
not surprising that he would speak only of pushing harder as
a viable strategy. To Hua, the strategy of pushing harder is
largely a function of the degree of support and unity. As will
be discussed in category 1-5, unity occupies a lofty position
in Hua ' s conceptualization of power. Basically, the greater
the unity, the greater one can push the opponent. "The people
of all countries must close ranks and resolutely struggle
against the war machinations of the superpowers." (58:36)
c. What Type of Action is Preferred?
Is action undertaken by one nation, or is action
taken in concert with other nations or organizations preferred?
















2. 10 100.0 100.0
0. 173 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 183 100.0
Again, the notion of unity occupies a lofty position of
importance for Hua. Because unity is tied to his perception
of power it is understandable that he would prefer multilateral
action. He repeatedly stresses the necessity of "win(ning)
over as many allies as possible" (49:41) and "form(ing) the
broadest possible united front against superpower hegemonism.
"
(16:6)
3 . How are the Risks of Political Action Calculated
,
Controlled and Accepted ?
Answers to this question provide the basis for ascer-
taining an actor's core beliefs regarding the feasibility of
risk-taking and the manner in which risk situations are inter-
preted.
a. How is Risk Assessed?
The risks of a particular action may be assessed
in terms of that particular undertaking or, in terms of one's
major goals or, solely in terms of the specific tactic em-
ployed. (For example, the risks of a bombing raid would be
assessed only in terms of its prospects for success rather




Typologies include: 1) Comprehensive Framework 2) Specific














1. 2 100.0 100.0
0. 181 MISSING 100.0
183 100.0
Because Hua so rarely discusses the concept of risk, the
results of this entire category are inconclusive. His few
references to risk are, however, couched in terms of a compre-
hensive goal. "No matter what may happen on the international
scene, the Chinese people will, as in the past, remain united
with the Korean people, and fight together and win victories
together with them." (20:A8)
4 . What is the Best Timing of Action to Advance One's
Interests ?
Answers to this question provide the basis for ascer-
taining an actor's beliefs concerning the relationships between
the timing of action and ultimate success.
a. How Important is Timing in the Achievement of
Major, Long Term Aspirations?
Timing is considered important if the success of
failure of the goal depends heavily upon its preciseness.
Typologies include: ' 1) Important 2) Not Important.
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b. How Important is Timing in the Success of
Specific Policy Undertakings?
Important,
Typologies include: 1) Important 2) Not
TABLE 35


































CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT!
1. 6 100.0 100.0
0. 177 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 183 100.0
Hua believes that timing is important in the pursuit of
both major goals and specific policies. As a "revolutionary"
leader, Hua recognizes the necessity and benefit of seizing
opportunities as they arise. "Every communist r every revolu-
tionary and every patriot should be clear about the situation,
(and) seize the present opportune moment." (57: Ell)
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There is a sense of urgency in most of his references to
timing.- "(We must) race against time and fight for speed and
step up our army's ... modernization." (14:10) " ... it is
imperative to convene the Fifth National Peoples Congress
before the due date." (11:4) References which indicated
that timing was not important were in conjunction with out-
comes which Hua believed to be inevitable.
c. Under What Circumstances is Action Required,
Permissible or Prohibited?
Typologies include: 1) Required 2) Permissible
3) Prohibited. Hua refers only to one primary circumstance
under which action is required and that is, if China is
attacked.
" (We) must go all out to strengthen preparedness against
war and be ready at all times to wipe out any enemy that
dares to invade us." (58:39)
5. What is the Utility and Role of Different Means for
Advancing One's Interests? What Resources Can One
Draw Upon in the Effort to Advance One's Interests ?
Answers to these questions provide the basis for
ascertaining an actor's tactical preferences and perceptions
concerning the nature of political power.
a. What Tactics are Used?
This category is concerned with specific tactics —
either the most appropriate tactic or the least appropriate
tactic. Typologies for Hua's most appropriate tactics include
1) Learn from Developed Nations 2) Unity 3) Rely on





















1. 5 13.9 13.9
2. 25 69.4 83.3
3. 1 2.8 86.1
4. 3 8.3 94.4
5. 2 5.6 100.0
0. 147 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 18 3 10 0.0
Chairman Hua ascribes predominantly to two general tactics
in the quest to guarantee Chinese security and defeat the
hegemonists. He summarizes the importance of the first by
saying that "unity is strength, unity means victory." (14:12)
He believes that "there is a strategic task common to the
people of the world over" (7:21) and that is to "consolidate
and expand the international united front against hegemony."
(7:21) Not only is such a tactic useful to China and the
Third World, to Hua it is absolutely essential. "A new world
war can be postponed so long as the people of the world main-
tain their unity." (50:8)
Hua believes that ultimate victory will only be achieved
once China has become a modern state. "Only by building up
a modern agriculture, industry, national defense and science
and technology can we provide our socialist system with a
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powerful material base, steadily consolidate and develop
this system, effectively defeat capitalism at home and find
ourselves in a stronger position to resist aggression from
abroad." (51:8) Yet Hua realizes that rapid achievement of
the Four Modernizations (currently a high goal) necessitates
a tactic heretofore unaccustomed in China — learning from
the ways of the West.
"As for natural science and technology, we are behind
advanced world levels . We admit our backwardness but
we refuse to lag behind; we must catch up. This re-
quires us to be good at absorbing whatever is good in
things foreign, take them over and turn them to our
account and combine our learning from foreign coun-
tries with our own inventiveness so that we can catch
up with and surpass advanced world levels as soon as
possible." (51:12)
b. How is Power Conceptualized?
This category is concerned with whether power is
believed to be strictly a function of military might or some-
thing else. It is also concerned with perceptions of avail-
able resources which are directly power enhancing and resources
whose unavailability is power inhibiting. Coding data for
the conception of power was aggregated into the following
typologies: 1) Military Only 2) Unity of the People
3) World Opinion 4) Culture 5) Allies 6) "Peoples War"
Concept 7) Manpower.
Coding data for those available resources considered as
power enhancing was aggregated into the following typologies
:
1) Superiority of Socialism 2) Manpower 3) Revolutionary
Spirit 4) Unity 5) Determination 5) Area. Coding data
for unavailable resources which would have enhanced a nation's
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power was aggregated into the following typologies: 1)












MILITARY ONLY 1. 1 10.0 10.0
UNITY OF PEOPLE 2. 4 40.0 50.0
WORLD OPINION 3. 1 10. 60.0
CULTURE 4. 1 10.0 70.0
ALLIES 5. 1 10.0 80.0
PEOPLES WAR CONCEPT 6. 1 10.0 90.0
MANPOWER 7. 1 10.0 100.0
0. 173 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 183 100.0
TABLE 39
RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR ENHANCING POWER
ADJUSTED CUM
ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREQ (PCT) (PCT)
SUPERIORITY OF SOCIALISM 1. 6 26.1 26.1
MANPOWER 2. 8 34.8 60.9
REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT 3. 2 8.7 69.6
UNITY 4. 4 17.4 87.0
DETERMINATION 5. 2 8.7 95.7
AREA 6. 1 4.3 100.0




The resources which Hua feels will further China's polit-
ical ends the most are socialism, manpower and unity. The
superiority of the socialist system is asserted frequently:
"our socialist political system and economic system are far
superior to the capitalists." (10:8) According to Hua, really
powerful combat effectiveness "comes from a close integration
of people who have a high level of proletarian consciousness
with modern weapons and equipment." (14:10) This is an im-
portant notion, for although Hua admits that China currently
lacks modern weaponry, the fact that China is socialist means
that when China does modernize she will be comparatively more
powerful than the capitalists.
On a number of occasions, Hua alludes to China's most
abundant resource, manpower, as being a source of power.
"The most powerful base and inexhaustible source of
strength in our country are the masses of the people
in their hundreds of millions." (51:9)
"An enemy that dares to intrude will certainly be
drowned in the vast ocean of people's war." (55:AA8)
That same unity which Hua stresses on the international
scene, is cited domestically as a current source of power.
He says that China's goal of the Four Modernizations will
certainly be met because of "the close unity of the whole Party,
the whole army and the people of all nationalities throughout
the country." (10:15)
The resource whose absence most directly inhibits China's
power is a solid, modern economic base. Hua freely acknowl-
edges China's retarded position. "At present, China is still
a developing socialist country and has limited material
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means." (77:4) An outgrowth of this underdevelopment which
directly impinges upon China's territorial security and posi-
tion vis-a-vis the superpowers' is the lack of modern weaponry
and equipment.
b. What are the Sources of Knowledge Cited in Support
of the Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs?
Typologies include: 1) Ideology 2) Trends (for
example, defense budgets, Gross National Product) 3) Expe-
rience 4) History 5) Specific Events 6) Faith (the point




















1. 60 36.3 36.3
2. 8 4.8 41.1
3. 77 46.6 87.7
4. 17 10.3 98
5. 2 1.2 99.4
6. 1 .6 100
0. 138 MISSING 100
TOTAL 303 100.0
By and large, Hua cites historical events and Maoist
ideology to substantiate his beliefs. For example, "History
has time and again proved that expansionists never come to a
good end, such was the case with Hitler, and the hegemonism
of today will come to no better end." (1:5) Also, "So long
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as social-imperialism and imperialism exist, war is inevitable."
It is interesting to note that historical precedents are
used primarily to substantiate internationally centered beliefs





In refining the operational code construct, Alexander
George concluded that it would tend to be resistant to change.
(166:216) This resistance would be accentuated by personality
rigidities and by a tendency to perceive and to deal with
current problems based on historical interpretations. Change
would therefore occur only as a result of some particularly
traumatic event, or very gradually over time.
An observation made by Walter Mischel lends support to
this assertion: "There is a great deal of evidence that our
cognitive constructions about ourselves and the world — our
personal theories about ourselves and those around us ...
often are extremely stable and highly resistant to change."
(183:17)
Hua Guofeng is an especially significant case for testing
this stability assumption. Because Hua attributes historical
precedent as his primary source of knowledge, his code would
tend to be firm. On the other hand, his reputation as a bal-
ance artist or one able to skillfully judge the relative
merits and popularity of issues would at the very least imply
the latent ability to smoothly and rapidly alter his stance.
This leads to an interesting question: Is the operational
code developed in this thesis a true representation of his
private beliefs or merely a politically necessary position?
If it is indeed the latter, change should be evident in at
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least one of several key time frames. For example, a valid
argument could be made asserting that prior to 197 6 Hua merely
parroted the Maoist code out of political necessity (survival)
.
If this were true, a shift should be apparent after Mao's death
and Hua's subsequent catapult to power, or after the fall of
the Gang of Four. Another time frame to observe would be the
resurrection of Deng Xiaoping. A lack of significant change
would lend credence to both the assumption of stability and
most importantly to the reality of the code developed by this
thesis.
In order to analyze the continuity of Hua's operational
code, all data was coded and stored in a computer by date.
The frequencies of responses coded for each question in each
belief category were aggregated by year and in the form of
two subprograms: before Mao's death (prior to 9 September
1976) and after Mao's death (9 September 197 6 to 31 December
1978) . Appendix D represents the results of this tabulation
using raw frequency and percentage of response (in paren-
theses) .
The results demonstrate a very consistent operational code.
The data comprising the code consisted of statements covering
his career primarily from his appointment as Vice Premier and
First Vice Chairman through Premier and Chairman. It spans a
time frame which includes Mao dominance, a senile Mao in a
figure head position, the Gang of Four controversy, Hua
control and the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping, yet throughout




Because the coded data is entirely of a nominal and
ordinal nature, high level statistical tests of comparison
were not possible. The lower order techniques which were
applicable, Sign Test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test
were used.
The Sign Test was run two ways in an attempt to overcome
some inherent difficulties in the nature of the operational
code data. Method I was structured on the percentage of
responses attributed to each category for each belief. Method
II was structured on raw frequency data. For each method, the
entire operational code belief system of one period was com-
pared with the entire operational code belief system of the
other. Additionally, each individual belief category was
tested separately with its twin in the other period.
With a null hypothesis, H :p=.5 (the two groups are the
same) , Method I failed to reject the null hypothesis while
Method II rejected the null hypothesis. It must be pointed
out that neither method was fully appropriate. Method II
failed to adequately take n (number of responses) into account,
A great majority of the plus signs were direct results of
greater n rather than any formal change in choice of response.
Method I controlled changes in n by using percentages. Hence,
if the response "conflictual" were cited fifteen times for
period one and twenty-five times for period two, this would
greatly influence Method II even though they both may repre-
sent 100% of the responses for that category, which would
mean no change in preference!
97

In testing to see if any of the individual beliefs had
changed, Method I failed to reject the null hypothesis in
every case (in other words, the beliefs were the same for
every period)
.
Method II rejected the null hypothesis (at
.05 level) for philosophical belief lb and philosophical belief
4. However, this rejection of H was primarily a result of
the inapplicability of Method II.
A higher order Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test was
conducted to determine if there had been any significant change
in any of the ordinally structured categories between the two
periods. Only one category proved to be significantly dif-
ferent: What is the likely response of an adversary to one's
own conciliatory action? This variable's significance can
be attributed to the lack of response for period one.
There is no significant difference between the beliefs
expressed prior to 9 September 1976 and those expressed after
9 September 197 6. This finding is based on three factors:
1) Failure of a sign test to find any significant dif-
ference
2) Failure of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test to
find any significant difference in the ordinal
measure categories
3) Coders review of the coding data which appears
strikingly similar between periods with no ob-
vious alterations of choice categories.
The only apparent differences are minor and consist of a
slight tendency on the part of Hua to downgrade his percep-
tion of opponents (primarily the United States) from destruc-
tionist to expansionist. There is some indication that the
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hostility with the superpowers may be more limited in nature
than previously assumed and borrowing technology from the
West has become a publically viable policy.
Aggregating frequencies by year also fails to illuminate
any appreciable change. Minor variations do occur, but this
is to be expected. Aggregating an operational code on such
a small scale runs the risk of distortion. Some of the var-
iances are interesting and can be related to peculiarities
or events of that year. For example, 1976 proved to be a
highly optimistic (unqualified) year. This was probably
politically essential to aid in weathering the effects of
Mao's death and the turbulence of the Gang of Four contro-
versy, and in an attempt to sell Hua as a symbol of unity.
1978 was a year marked by an increase in references to
potential war and an increase in Hua ' s preoccupation with,
and verbal lambasting of the Soviet Union. It must be ob-
served, however, that Hua's unprecedented trip to Eastern
Europe in August, 1978 provided him with an excellent forum.
Additionally, most of the references in this regard occurred
during that trip.
1978 also marked an increase in references to the necessity
for borrowing technology from the West. This is directly re-
lated to the changing of the "line" at the Fifth National
Peoples Congress in February, 1978, to the Four Modernizations.
It may also reflect the rapid resurrection of a strong rival,





VI. TOWARD A TYPOLOGY
In a critique of the "cognitive mapping" (158) approach
to political analysis, Thomas Trumble questioned both its
internal and external validity on the grounds that existing
studies are descriptive rather than comparative. (191:3)
Most operational code studies completed to date have been more
concerned with describing a detailed set of beliefs than in
identifying and analyzing linkages among these beliefs.
(172:150) The very concept of a belief system assumes that
the subject's beliefs form patterned ways of thinking about
history and politics. Every belief system has a belief hier-
archy ranging from the least important to the most important.
These "most important" or core beliefs are those which affect
the range of response to other questions which compose the
operational code. It is the existence of these stable, pri-
mary beliefs which enable system typologies to be constructed.
Such a typology would provide a framework to assist an analyst
in comparing belief systems.
Holsti depicts four areas of study in which the opera-
tional code construct would prove useful: political social-
ization, decision making and two types of comparative elite
studies (i.e., two leaders during the same time frame or two
leaders in different time frames) . Whether the code serves
as an independent or dependent variable in such studies,
analysis would be greatly enhanced by focusing part of the
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comparison on types of belief systems in conjunction with the
detailed focusing on the subject's individual beliefs. (175:153)
To date, little work has been done in this area. The only
definitive steps in this direction were made by Holsti under
contract to the National Science Foundation. Two points of
importance emerged from his analysis of typologies:
1. Certain types of beliefs do form clusters with
greater regularity than would be expected by chance.
2. His evidence supported the proposition that the
first philosophical belief is among the most salient
of these beliefs.
The two most significant limitations of the study were
first, an insufficient number of operational code studies were
included in testing the typology and second, the data was
probably skewed by an overrepresentation of American leaders
(8 of 12 cases) , Western democracies (11 of 12 cases) and
developed societies (all 12 cases). (175:270) Although the
inclusion of Hua Guofeng as a test case would be of marginal
value to the numbers limitation, it would provide a rather
unique addition in terms of the subject's background and, if
positively correlated, would lend more credence to Holsti 's
typology.
Authors of several operational code studies have suggested
that philosophical belief 1(a) was one of the most prominent
candidates for a "master belief" or one which is likely to
constrain (or dominate) other elements of the belief system.
(175:156) In devising his typology, Holsti used this belief
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as the pivot. The typology system centers around the per-
ception of the political universe and is two dimensionally
structured. Either conflict is permanent, or it is temporary,
in which case the subject implies that given certain condi-
tions (i.e., world communism) the political environment would
be harmonious. The second dimension of the typology matrix
concerns the primary sources of conflict. Figure 1 depicts
Holsti's typology matrix.
WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL
NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE?









Attributes of nations B E
International system C F
Figure 1
Typology Categories
Because Hua is a communist, he falls within the type B
orientation which holds that, because the sources of conflict
are to be found in the attributes of certain nations or classes
of nations, the necessary and sufficient conditions of peace
are their reform or elimination.
To test the typology, Hua Guofeng's beliefs will be com-
pared with Holsti's complete category B typology across the
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full spectrum of beliefs by means of a rough goodness of fit
test. Each belief is scored with a code representing a rough
estimate of the degree to which it is in agreement with the
hypothesized response:
++ very substantial agreement
+ agreement on balance
insufficient or inconclusive evidence
- disagreement on balance
— very substantial disagreement
Holsti's study utilized three type B subjects:
1. Kurt Schumacher (German Socialist leader)
2. John Foster Dulles (note: the Wilsonian vision
of world democracy falls in this category)
3. the Bolsheviks.
All three were contrasted with Hua Guofeng's operational code.
The case of Kurt Schumacher provides the closest match and is
therefore included in Appendix E. (157)
All cases would not be expected to fit even a proven typ-
ology uniformly. Deviations could occur because the linkages
among a subject's beliefs arise not only from logical con-
sideration, but also from "psycho-logic" (154) and self-
esteem. (185) As seen in Table 42, however, Hua's operational
code adequately fits the type B typology. The goodness of fit
is particularly close for all of the philosophical beliefs
while somewhat sporadic for the instrumental beliefs. This
observation regarding the instrumental beliefs is generally
true for each of the type B subjects and in many respects,





SUMMARY OF RESULTS, COMPARING PREDICTED AND
ACTUAL OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS (175:266)
Operational John Foster Kurt














1-1 ++ ++ + ++
1-2 + +
1-3 ++ + +




One could conclude from this observation that perhaps the
philosophical beliefs are more highly dominated by one's per-
ception of the political universe than the instrumental beliefs
If this were the case, perhaps the inclusion of a third di-
mension (i.e., the selection of goals or role) would create a
more durable set of typology categories.
Table 42 demonstrates the close similarity on a general-
ized level, between the operational codes of Hua Guofeng and
Kurt Schumacher. Excluding instrumental belief #3 (risk) due
to a lack of data for both cases, there remains but two areas
of discordance: instrumental belief #2 and instrumental
belief #5. In instrumental belief #5 (tactics) there is an
inconclusive fit between each case and the hypothesized
response. However, if compared together, the two cases agree
on balance. Both believe that unity, public support and the
masses are essential ingredients of power. Instrumental
belief #2, on the other hand, presents a more significant
difference. Hua appears more pragmatic than any of the other
type B subjects. Although he would agree that one cannot
abandon an ultimate goal, he falls far short of advocating a
"push to the limit" strategy for the conduct of Chinese for-
eign policy. He is committed to complete and thorough con-
tingency planning and keenly aware of the need for strength
(allies) before any physical confrontation with a strong
opponent.
The most significant point of discord with the typology
(and Schumacher) lies in the use of an incrementalist approach.
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To Schumacher, this strategy is especially inappropriate while
to Hua and to some extent, the Bolsheviks, it is useful and
reasonable. It must be noted, however, that Schumacher spent
his entire career in the opposition with no real control of,
nor responsibility for Germany's actions. It is understand-
ably easier to speak in terms of pushing to the limit from
such a position. Hua on the other hand, became the leader
of an enormous and populous country. The realities and res-
ponsibilities of such a role could well breed a degree of
pragmatism and could help explain this point of discordance.
Perhaps role has a more significant, if not dominant im-
pact on the instrumental beliefs. This notion certainly has
some face validity. However, due to the rather limited vol-
ume of operational code studies thus far completed, little can
be done in this regard. An effort was made to link the role
of Secretary of State (in the cases of Acheson, Dulles,





A. OPERATIONAL CODE SUMMARY
1. Philosophical Beliefs
Not only does conflict thrive in the current inter-
national environment, but it is intensifying and is protracted
in nature. International conflict is a zero-sum interaction
with the elimination of the opponent being the only permanent
solution. Conflict is a functional and necessary prerequisite
for the realization of China's primary goals.
There are two causal dimensions at the root of inter-
national conflict: nationalism and standard power politics.
Both dimensions are related because of the role played in each
by the superpowers. The first dimension views today's conflict
from the perspective of superpower imperialism over the Third
World, while the latter dimension views conflict as a head to
head rivalry between the superpowers. The struggle of the
Third World against imperialism must be a united effort. Not
only is nationalism and anti-imperialism an honored and neces-
sary effort, it is an irresistible development. The primary
source of world conflict is superpower rivalry. This conten-
tion extends throughout the world and affects all countries
either directly, as in Africa, or indirectly, with the growing
threat of war.
There are three general contributing approaches toward
the temporary attainment of world peace. The first is com-
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munication. Among friends, conflicts can be resolved through
discussion. Other aspects of communication include state
visits and various exchange programs. On a more general scale,
one can only hope to establish and maintain peace through
mutual adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
Temporary peace among unfriendly or hostile countries (for
example, with superpowers and others who fail to heed the Five
Principles) requires the third approach: balance of power.
A proper balance of power scheme includes a united Third World
(including China) which will effectively oppose superpower
hegemonism. Unity is the key to the balance. A united and
unaligned Europe is also desirable. Although superpower
contention is the greatest source of turmoil in today's inter-
national environment, the environment itself can no longer be
considered to be polarized. The growth in the number of non-
aligned countries and increased Third World unity are proof
of a collapsing polarism and emerging pluralism. In the con-
text of international relations, all current conflicts are
small manifestations of a larger, historical conflict: im-
perialism versus the underdeveloped peoples of the world.
The Soviet Union is destructionist in nature and intent
upon global supremacy. The United States is expansionist in
nature. There are several sources simultaneously driving the
selection and pursuit of their goals. Precedent for present
goals run abundant in history. Imperialism as a form of cap-
italist ideology (and Soviet revisionism) also contributes
to the superpowers' aggressive drives and deepening rivalry.
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Conflict with the Soviet Union and capitalist society is per-
manent and of an all-encompassing and ideologically based
nature. Not only is this hostility of a permanent nature, it
is uncontrollable. Any attempt at conciliation will be either
ignored or taken advantage of by the opponent. However, if
confronted by policies of firmness they would be forced to
back down because they are merely paper tigers.
The Soviet Union and the United States believe that
conflict is not only inevitable but that it is a desirable
route to the attainment of goals. This is especially true in
the case of the Soviet Union. War is therefore inevitable.
The superpowers use an optimizing strategy in their desire to
dominate the world. Their goals are unrealistic because they
lack the resolve and power to reach them.
China is defensively oriented. The first dimension
of China's defensive goals concerns preventing Soviet expan-
sion, specifically at China's expense, but also on a global
scale. The second dimension concerns modernization. In order
to accomplish this particular goal, China requires a prolonged
peaceful international environment. Because there can be no
peace while the superpowers are free to pursue their expansion-
ist policies, the urgency and preeminence of opposing hegemony
is self-evident.
Optimism is appropriate because of: 1. the correct-
ness of the current line 2. the superiority of socialism




Time is on China's side for two reasons. First,
the international environment is changing in a favorable
direction. It is favorable because liberation struggles are
on the rise and the international united front against hege-
mony is broadening.
Second, China is still underdeveloped and therefore
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, in particular.
The passage of time affords the opportunity to improve China's
position.
Political life is predictable with historical develop-
ment being the most predictable aspect of political life. His-
tory is evolving in accordance with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
theory so the political future is indisputable and certain.
Historical precedent can and should be used to explain and
justify current actions. A leader must actively strive to
manipulate history and guide his people in a favorable
direction.
2. Instrumental Beliefs
A comprehensive framework is necessary for establish-
ing and achieving goals. All activities whether political,
economic, military or social must be guided and directed by a
detailed plan or line. Goals should be optimal. In order to
achieve such goals, the line must be rigidly followed.
When formulating strategies all eventualities must be
investigated and considered. Unpreparedness means vulner-
ability and must be avoided. Incrementally structured frame-
works are the most productive.
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One should never be hesitant to push an opponent pro-
viding he has the strength to back it up. Unity and support
are vital components of strength therefore, multilateral action
has significantly greater impact in the international environ-
ment.
Timing is important in the pursuit of both major goals
and specific policies. Opportunities must be recognized and
seized as they arise.
There are two primary tactics to use in the quest to
guarantee China's security and the ultimate defeat of the
hegemonists. The first is the forging of a strong bond of
Third World unity opposing hegemonist aggression. This is
important in the short term to allow China time to complete
modernization. Ultimate victory can only be achieved once
China has become a modern state. Rapid achievement of modern-
ization requires the tactic of learning from Western advances
which requires open and friendly cooperation.
Power is composed of many contributing elements none
of which is dominant. It is a blend of a modern, well equip-
ped armed force, a strong material base and most importantly
the active support of a united population.
Socialism, manpower, unity and spirit are China's
most valuable resources because they directly enhance China's
power
.
The most significant limitation on China's power is
an underdeveloped economy. An outgrowth of this underdevelop-
ment which directly impinges upon China's territorial security
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and position vis-a-vis her opponents' is the lack of modern
weaponry and equipment.
B. OBSERVATIONS
It is very important to reaffirm that beliefs do not con-
stitute a set of decision rules which are automatically applied
by policy makers during situations of choice. One to one
relationships do not necessarily exist between operational codes
and foreign policy actions. The actual relationship is quite
complex and also includes the affects of role and belief varia-
tions among in house deicison makers (even in an authoritarian
state) . The operational code is only one of several interven-
ing variables which shape and constrain decision making. It
is utilized as "a means of orienting (a decision maker) to the
environment; as a lens or prism through which information is
processed and given meaning; as a diagnostic scheme; as one
means of coping with the cognitive constraints on rationality;
and as a source of guidelines that may guide or bound -
but necessarily determine - policy prescriptions and choices."
(175:25) The operational code defines the individual's per-
ception of his environment, the scheme by which problems are
identified and favored methods of problem solving. This is
particularly true during times of crisis.
Keeping the above caveat in mind, several observations
based upon Hua's code and background can be made concerning
probable trends in Chinese foreign policy. Without greater
knowledge of inner Politburo workings or insight into the
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operational codes of other high ranking figures, most notable
Deng Xiaoping, the author hesitates to use the word prediction,
What can be observed are trends and policies which conform
favorably to Hua's operational code and thereby are likely to
merit his support.
1. It is clear from Hua's operational code that China
should bide its time and gain strength. Hua believes that
conflict is necessary for the attainment of China's ultimate
goals. Moreover, he feels that war is inevitable. However,
China's substandard position militarily vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union was graphically demonstrated by a rather poor showing
during the Viet Nam invasion. Hua does not condone action
without sufficient strength to ensure success. Consequently,
to Hua, the time is not right for any direct confrontation.
What is required is the safe passage of time to enable China
to advance and improve her position for the inevitable con-
frontation. To advance, China needs the industrial expertise
of the West. The United States is perceived as considerably
less threatening to China than the Soviet Union. Therefore,
what is required is a marriage of convenience between China
and the United States and/or Western Europe. China can pro-
vide a vast market for capitalist enterprises while being
assisted in advancing in the industrial, technological and
military spheres. Hua's code clearly indicates that such a
policy would only be temporary. He leaves no doubt about
ultimate line-ups and the final victor.
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2. Reconciliation with the Soviet Union would not be in
keeping with Hua's code. Hua continually expresses distrust
and paranoia concerning Soviet intentions. Hua believes that
Soviet goals of domination especially over China are well
founded in history, and history is the primary source of Hua's
beliefs. Consequently, a change in leadership resulting from
Brezhnev's death would not alter this perception. Hua is
adamantly opposed to appeasement and appears to be imbued with
the historic Middle Kingdom concept. Although China is in-
sufficiently prepared for any direct confrontation with the
Soviet Union, Hua's operational code would call for standing
fast in border negotiations and on any matters of principle.
Verbal confrontations throughout the world would be appropriate
3. China's punitive invasion of Viet Nam was not in keep-
ing with Hua's code. The purposes of the invasion are under-
standable and compatible with the code, however, the divergence
exists in its unilateral nature. Hua continually emphasizes
the need for unity and multilateral action. Although acting
from a position of strength militarily (although this later
came under question) , China lacked the international (Third
World) approval which occupies such a lofty position in Hua's
code.
4. Every effort made to unify the Third World and in-
crease China's prestige in that arena would be compatible
with Hua's code. ^his would include aid and arms sales as
part of a massive public relations campaign designed to pro-
mote China as the spokesman of the Third World.
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5. Hua views power as being composed of military might,
industrial capacity and most importantly, unity and backing
of the population. Internally, policies of maintaining and/or
improving the spirit of the population would be particularly
compatible with his code. Such policies could include incen-
tives, increased standard of living, greater educational
opportunities and so forth.
6. A reassessment and restructuring of priorities to
emphasize increased military capability would also be con-
sistent with his code.
7. Hua will probably remain unobtrusive. This is simply
his style. Speech making and traveling will be left to others
He is foremost an administrator, a moderator and a symbol of
unity and stability. Hua Guofeng is a politically shrewd and
orphic figure with a demonstrated ability to survive. He
will be extremely difficult to muscle out of prominence.
C . LIMITATIONS
The operational code is not a flawless methodology. It
is necessary to make certain assumptions whose absolute valid-
ity may never be definitely proven. The two most notable and
potentially criticizable of these assumptions are first, that
an operational code/belief system can be gleaned from an
individual's expressions and second, that it can be derived
from public utterances. It is not the author's intent to play
the devil's advocate on this issue. Let it suffice to say
that the literature runs abundant with arguments both pro and
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con. What is important is to acknowledge that these assump-
tions are limitations upon the methodology itself, to certain
corners of the political science and policy science fields.
This thesis utilized only public, English language primary
sources in the construction of the operational code. Not only
were the sources public, they were clearly those speeches and
writings consciously chosen for release to the West and there-
fore of a propaganda nature. Additionally, as can be seen
from Appendix A, few sources were available prior to Hua's
emergence in 1975. Without a linguistic command of Mandarin
Chinese, these limitations must be accepted. It is important
to realize, however, that consciously or otherwise, Hua is
portrayed to Western policy makers precisely in the manner
delineated by this operational code. Irregardless of the public
versus private statement controversy or the Chinese versus
English source limitation, the Hua Guofeng the West is able
to see is the Hua Guofeng of this thesis 1
D. FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis provides valuable insight into the enigmatic
Hua Guofeng and would be particularly useful with his emergence
as uncontested ruler of the Peoples Republic of China. Yet,
this thesis is merely a foot in the door. The following areas
of research are necessary before the operational code can be
utilized to its fullest in understanding/predicting Chinese
decision making and in international relations in general:
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1. The first priority should be the parallel construc-
tion of a Chinese language based operational code on Hua '
s
early years. Editions of Hsin Hunan Pao are available from
1951-1960 which contain many Hua speeches and articles. Ad-
ditionally, transcribed Changsha radio broadcasts are avail-
able covering the years 1963-1969. (130:3) Once constructed,
the early Chinese code can be contrasted with the current
English code (this thesis) to determine:
a. if the Hua portrayed to Western policy makers is,
in fact, an accurate portrayal (i.e., the accuracy of this
English source code)
b. if there have been any major changes in his code
c. the composite, total operational code of Hua
Guofeng. This study is tailor made for a Naval Postgraduate
School, area studies student with a Chinese language back-
ground and/or concurrent language specialty at the Defense
Language Institute.
2. The second priority should be the construction of a
parallel English operational code on Deng Xiaoping. The
groundwork has already been accomplished by this thesis, leav-
ing only the assembly of sources (available at the Hoover
Institute, Stanford University) and coding. A comparison of
Hua and Deng's operational codes would provide:
a. insight into inner Politburo factioning and gen-
eral decision making in the Peoples Republic of China
b. a reference for evaluating who is on top, or who
is spearheading which directives
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c. an opportunity to ascertain how precisely the
operational code construct can differentiate between similar
typologies
d. insight into the numerous rise/falls of Deng,
i.e., has his code changed between the three major periods:
prior to the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976, 1977 to present
e. insight into the much publicized but poorly under-
stood Hua-Deng rift.
3. The third priority should be the construction of
operational codes on a broad spectrum of political leaders
and elites i.e., the top members of the Soviet Politburo with
an eye toward the succession question, Yasser Arafat, Ferdinand
Marcos. This would be the first step toward detailed compara-
tive analysis and the establishment of usable theoretical
typologies. These analyses can be comparisons of contemporary
figures; they can span history; they can be of leader types,
countries, and so forth.
4. The fourth priority should be more research into the
effects of role upon the operational code construct, especially
the instrumental beliefs.
5. The fifth priority should be the periodic monitoring
and update of Hua's operational code. This exercise is neces-
sary for the following reasons:
a. to continually build on detail and the more subtle
components of the code
b. to note any temporary deviations
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c. to note any permanent changes
d. it is especially important to monitor the code
closely during times of crisis when, theoretically, it has
the highest probability of being adhered to.
6. The sixth priority should be research into the linkage









































The following questionnaire was given to ten coders as
described in Chapter III. The results are as follows:
Coder Response Author Response
(percentage)









No Reference 90 X









Active Seeker of Peace 10
No Reference °
£• Prepare Ground 7° *




overall 80$ intercoder reliability
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This exercise is intended to explore a political actor's
operational code belief system. The code includes beliefs
concerning the political universe, one's fundamental goals,
the best strategy for achieving these goals, and a conception
of what the opponent's goals are. Please read each statement
and then select the best answer to the question which follows.
Place an X next to the appropriate response. Do not infer
anything. If there is no specific sentence or phrase in the
statement which indicates the actor's belief, mark no reference.
Disregard prior opinions about the countries involved.
A. But we cannot fail to see that imperialism and
hegeraonism, locked in their rivalry for world
hegemony, are engaged in fervid arms expansion
and war preparations and are carrying out agres-
sion and expansion everywhere, posing a grave threat
to peace and to the security of all countries.
Recently, the series of incidents which have occurred
in the Near and Middle East and in Africa and Asia
clearly demonstrator that their contention is daily
intensifying and that the factors for war are visibly
growing.
What is the nature of the political universe ?
1. Gonflictual ( ) The author indicates that the present
international system is dominated by conflictual relations
among nations or coalitions of nations.
2* Mixed ( ) There is reference to both conflictual and
harmonious patterns of relations within the contemporary
international system.
3, Harmonious ( ) The actor regards the contemporary inter-
national system as one in which mutual interests are dominant
and are recognized as such.
^
iK No reference ( )
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B. For its socialist construction, China needs an
international environment of peace and a domestic
situation of stability, unity and great order. We
must highly treasure our unity, safeguard and
strengthen it. The stronger our unity, the greater
will be our strength and the better we shall be able
to manage our affairs.
What are the conditions of peace ?
1. Education/communication ( ) The author states that better
education and information, or better communication between nations
will allay the sources of conflict in the contemporary international
system.
2. Eliminate offending nation(s) ( ) The author indicates that
the necessary conditions of peace require the elimination or trans-
formation of a specific nation or a class of nations.
3. Eliminate inequalities ( ) The author states that eliminating
inequalities among nations will create the conditions of peace.
4>. Maintain balance of power ( ) The author asserts that the
best or only means of ensuring peace in the contemporary interna-
tional system is to maintain a balance of power, to prevent expan-
sion by ambitious adversaries, to deter aggression, etc.
5. Transform the system ( ) The author indicates that a signif-
icant change in the structure and functioning of the international
system is required.
6. No reference ( )
G. Internationally, since the two hegemonist powers, the
Soviet Union and the United States, are locked in a
fierce struggle for world domination, war is bound to
break out sooner or later. The Soviet revisionists
are bent on subjugating our country.
What are the opponent's goals?
1. Destructionist ( ) The opponent is believed to have virtu-
ally unlimited goals i such as universal hegemony, destruction
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or radical transformation of the international system,
2. Expansionist ( ) The opponent is regarded as aggressive,
but his goals fall short of total destruction.
3. Defensive ( ) The opponent is believed to be primarily
concerned with his own security or maintenance of some status
quo.
^. Conciliatory ( ) The opponent is viewed as ready and wil-
ling to undertake at least limited accommodation.
5. No reference ( )
D# In their rivalry for world hegemony the superpowers
have reached out their hands everywhere, aggravating
world tension. This calls for serious attention. We
must heighten our vigilance and intensify our prepared-
ness against war. We are opposed to appeasement.
Together with people all over the world, we are determined
to combat superpower hegemonism and upset hegemonist world
strategic plans so as to put off the outbreak of a world
war and defend world peace.
What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?
1. Destructionist ( ) The actor's goals are unlimited, including
universal hegemony.
2. Expansionist ( ) Although the actor is active in the pursuit
of interests, his goals fall short of total destruction, and do
not include transformation of the international system.
3« Defensive ( ) The actor is primarily concerned with security
and maintenance of the status quo. His quest for security may in-
fringe on another
•
a sovereignty and could even lead to destroying
part of the opponent's nation. His concept of the status quo may
also be open to question. However, he sees himself as primarily
concerned with security instead of hegemony or territorial expansion.





5. Active seeker of peace ( ) The actor desires to undertake
major initiatives for peace,
6. No reference ( )
B. We believe that the outbreak of war can be put off,
but then the people of all countries must close ranks,
sharpen their vigilance, prepare against all eventu-
alities, oppose appeasement, resolutely struggle against
the war machinations of the superpowers and foil their
strategic dispositions* In this way, even if the super-
powers gamble with war, the people of the world will not
be caught in a vulnerable state of unpreparedness.
What are the approaches to the pursuit of goals?
1* Prepare ground ( ) The actor believes that the best way to
pursue goals is to make very careful prior preparations.
2. Try and see- ( ) The actor takes action as a way of testing
what is feasible and what is not. It is not necessary or feasible
to determine what the outcome will be.
3. Incremental ( ) The actor emphasizes the value of limited
gains.
4. Blitakrieg strategy ( ) The actor believes that the most
effective strategy involves committing a major portion of one's
resources and a full scale effort to deal with the problem.
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